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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Was the determination by the Industrial Commission 
that the repondent, Anna Webster, was partially dependent within 
the limits of reasonableness or rationality when taking into 
account the clear fact that without dependency benefits the 
respondent has $85f504.72 in savings and has sufficient funds to 
meet her stated expenses and support herself in the style to 
which she is accustomed? 
2. Did the Industrial Commission commit reversible 
error when it failed to set out any standard or guideline by 
which to determine the dependency of survivors of workers killed 
as a result of industrial accidents after the termination of the 
312 week initial dependency period? 
3. Did the Industrial Commission commit reversible 
error when it refused to require the respondent to invade the 
corpus of her $85f504.72 in savings, if necessary, and when it 
considered only the interest on this amount and failed to 
consider the amortization of her mortgage in September of 1985 in 
determining her dependency? 
4. Did the Industrial Commission commit reversible 
error when it failed to hold that an annual clothing expense of 
$2,400 was excessive? 
5. Did the Industrial Commission commit reversible 
error when it required the appellant to pay amounts beyond 312 
weeks as set out in Utah Code Annotated § 35-1-68 and refused to 
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order the Second Injury Fund to pay dependency benefits after the 
312 week period as provided in Utah Code Annotated § 35-1-70. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On July 20, 1979f Mr. Gene Websterf husband of the 
respondent, Anna Webster, and an employee of LDS Hospital was 
involved in a motorcycle accident which occurred while he was in 
the course of his employment. Temporary total disability bene-
fits commenced in August 1979 (Record at 139)(Record hereinafter 
referred to as "R."). On February 23, 1981, Mr. Webster's status 
was changed to permanent total disability and benefits were paid 
accordingly (R.10). On December 15, 1982, Mr. Webster died due 
to complications arising out of his industrial accident (R. 16, 
139). After Mr. Webster's death, Mrs. Webster received depen-
dency benefits for the equivalent of 312 weeks from the date of 
the injury as required in Utah Code Annotated (hereinafter 
U.C.A.) § 35-1-67 and § 35-1-68 (Contained in Addendum) as 
ordered by the Industrial Commission (R. 14, 139). The record 
shows that between 1979 and the date benefits ended in 1985, 
weekly compensation paid to Mr. Webster and to his wife after his 
death, amounted to $55,848.00 (R. 14), not including medical 
expenses in the amount of at least $78,166.16 (R. 14). On the 
date of termination of benefits Mrs. Webster was receiving 
$179.00 per week or $716.00 per month (R. 10, 46). 
Upon completion of the equivalent of 312 weeks of bene-
fits, payments to Mrs. Webster were terminated in 1985 (R.10, 
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31). Mrs. Webster requested continued benefits (R. 21-23, 29) 
from the Second Injury Fund which request was refused, notwith-
standing the language in U.C.A. § 35-1-70 (contained in 
Addendum). Mrs. Webster then applied for a dependency review 
provided for in U.C.A. § 35-1-68 (R.30). 
A hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge of 
the Industrial Commission on June 26, 1985, (See ALJ's Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order in Addendum). The 
Administrative Law Judge, in an order dated July 2, 1985, held 
Mrs. Webster to be partially dependent and awarded her $89.50 per 
week or $358.00 per month continuing until otherwise ordered (R. 
78-80). A transcript of the proceedings was ordered and an 
extension for filing a Motion for Review obtained (R. 107-108). 
The Motion for Review was filed with the Industrial Commission on 
August 26, 1985, in compliance with the order of the 
Administrative Law Judge (R. 122-123). 
During the pendency of the consideration of the Motion 
for Review the employer requested the Second Injury Fund to pay 
benefits beyond the 312 week period to the claimant and survivor 
of Mr. Webster pursuant to U.C.A. § 35-1-70 (contained in 
Addendum), which so provides (R. 136). The Second Injury Fund 
refused (R. 137), and the defendant requested that the Industrial 
Commission order the Second Injury Fund to comply with U.C.A. § 
35-1-70 (R. 138). 
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In an opinion dated January 9, 1986f the Industrial 
Commission denied the Motion for Review and affirmed the 
Administrative Law Judge's determination of partial dependency 
(R. 139-141). (See Order Denying Motion for Review contained in 
Addendum.) The Commission also refused to require the Second 
Injury Fund to pay the benefits beyond the 312 week period. 
The appellant's Petition for Review was filed with the 
Clerk of this Court January 21, 1986 (R. 143-144). The Docketing 
Statement was filed February 6, 1986. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts in this case are not in dispute. After the 
death of Mrs. Webster's husband in 1982, she received dependency 
benefits for the equivalent of 312 weeks after the date of the 
injury of her husband as required by U.C.A. §35-1-68. (Mr. 
Webster was injured in 1979.) 
At the time of the hearing before the administrative law 
judge, at which time Mrs. Webster requested continued dependency 
benefits beyond 312 weeks, it was shown that she had on deposit 
in various savings accounts $85,504.72 (R. 48, 88). The claimant 
testified that the total annual interest on this amount was 
$8,093.33 (R. 59-60, 80, 90). She additionally testified that 
she received monthly social security disability payments in the 
amount of $493.60 (R. 86) and that her monthly retirement benefit 
from LDS Hospital was $120.94 (R. 44, 88). It was shown that in 
her checking account she had on deposit a balance of $1,528.87 
(R. 91). Her stated yearly income plus cash on hand at the time 
of the hearing was $16,996.68. Mrs. Webster's stated yearly 
expenses were $16,024.00 (R. 87)f which included an annual 
estimated clothing expense of $2,400 (R. 48-49, 87). 
However, in September 1985, her yearly mortgage expense 
of $2,592.00 was reduced to the annual property tax of $405.95 
due to the fact that the mortgage was paid in full that month, 
meaning a reduction in annual expense of $2,187.00 (R. 50-51). 
Mrs. Webster's monthly mortgage payment prior to payment in full 
in September 1985 was $231.00 (R. 50-51). Because Mrs. Webster 
did not need to make three payments in 1985 her expenses were 
reduced by $693.00, reducing the annual stated expenses of Mrs. 
Webster for 1985 from $16,024.00 to $15,331.00. Her financial 
status for 1985 based on information she provided is summarized 
as follows: 
INCOME SUMMARY 
12 months x $493.60 (Social Security) $ 5,923.20 
12 months x $120.94 (Pension) 1,451.28 
Interest on Savings of $85,504.72 8,093.33 
Cash on hand (checking account) 1,528 .87 
TOTAL AVAILABLE INCOME (1985) $16,996.68 
EXPENSE SUMMARY 
Stated estimated expenses $16,024.00 
less 3 house payments (3 x $231.00) 693.00 
MRS. WEBSTER'S ACTUAL TOTAL EXPENSES 
(1985) $15,331.00 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
U.C.A. § 35-1-68 requires that the dependency review at 
the end of the 312 week period be based on the applicant's cir-
cumstances existing "at the time of the dependency review." Even 
without taking into account the corpus of the $85,504.72 in 
savings that Mrs. Webster had on deposit at the time of the 
dependency review, her stated interest income and cash on hand, 
which totaled $16,996.69, exceeded her yearly stated expenses of 
$16,024.00 (R.87). This is true even if no deduction is made for 
the $2,400.00 annual clothing expense and monthly $231.00 mortage 
expense which ended in September of 1985 (R.51). Her actual 
expenses less three $231.00 mortgage payments was $15,331.00. 
Accordingly, there was more than adequate income to meet 
Mrs. Webster's stated living expenses in 1985 without taking into 
account the reduction in expenses as indicated by the payoff of 
the mortgage and the inordinately high estimated yearly clothing 
expense of $2,400.00. 
Considering that dependency after the initial 312 week 
period is to be determined based on the circumstances and 
conditions at the time of the dependency review, the appellant 
maintains that the Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial 
Commission erred when they determined that the claimant was 
partially dependent. With the reduction of three mortgage 
payments of $231.00 each, totalling $693.00, Mrs. Webster's 1985 
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estimated annual expenses of $16f024.00 was reduced to 
$15f331.00. This was well within the established annual income 
of the claimant of $16f996.68. Even a lower figure of 
$15/467.81, arrived at by disallowing the amount of cash on hand 
evidenced in Mrs. Webster's checking account, still would allow 
the respondent to spend $200.00 per month for clothes which she 
claimed was her accustomed lifestyle. 
For 1986, Mrs. Webster's expenses are reduced by 12 
payments of $231.00 each or $2,772 which, by adding back the 
property tax obligation of $405.95, would mean a total annual 
expense reduction of $2,366.05 for 1986 for a total expense in 
1986 of $13,657.95. 
The appellant maintains that it is painfully clear that 
even without considering the $85,504.72 which the claimant had on 
deposit, her income was sufficient to cover her stated expenses. 
The $85,504.72 the claimant-respondent had in savings 
should be considered as an asset, and the applicant should also 
be required to utilize this amount for her expenses. In taking 
into account this large sum of money, she can hardly be dependent 
and, in fact, by most standards would be considered affluent. 
The self-insured employer should not be forced to build 
the applicant's estate which is what the Industrial Commission 
has accomplished by refusing to require the claimant-respondent 
to utilize any portion of the of the principal of her substantial 
savings. 
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To compound the lack of rationality of its decision, the 
Industrial Commission provided no standard upon which to judge 
whether the survivor of an employee who has died as a result of 
an industrial injury is dependent at the time of the dependency 
review. Rather, the Commission simply stated in its denial of 
the appellant's motion for review: 
The Commission finds this [the award] to be an 
equitable compromise between the interest of 
the two parties. (R. 141) (emphasis added) 
While compromise may be appropriate in a settlement, it is not a 
standard upon which to determine whether a decedent's survivor is 
wholly or partially dependent. 
Finally, the appellant maintains that although U.C.A. 
§ 35-1-68 requires initial payment of dependency benefits beyond 
the 312 week period by the employer upon a finding on continued 
dependency, reimbursement is contemplated by U.C.A. § 35-1-70, 
otherwise, this statutory provision is void of any meaning. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DETERMINATION THAT THE RESPONDENT WEBSTER WAS 
PARTIALLY DEPENDENT, WAS NOT WITHIN THE LIMITS OF 
REASONABLENESS OR RATIONALITY, AND THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DID SO. 
Decisions of the Industrial Commission regarding 
workers' compensation when considered on appeal to the Supreme 
Court must fall within limits of reasonableness or rationality. 
As stated in Board of Education of Alpine School District v. 
Olsen, 684 P.2d 49, 51 (Ut. 1984): 
The decision belowf that Olsen [the claimant] 
was an employee for purposes of Workers1 
Compensation is entitled to some deference, 
but it is subject to judiciary review to 
assure that it falls within the limits of 
reasonableness or rationality. 
A. Dependency was not determined based on the facts and circum-
stances at the time of the hearing 
Utah law is clear that after a dependent of an employee 
who has died receives the equivalent of no more than 85% of the 
state average weekly wage at the time of injury for a period not 
to exceed six years from the date of the injury (U.C.A. § 35-1-
68(2)(b)(i)), that further consideration of dependency after that 
period is to be based on the operative facts and circumstances at 
the time of the continued dependency hearing. As stated in 
U.C.A. § 35-1-68(2)(b)(iii): 
The issue of dependency shall be subject 
to review by the Commission at the end of the 
initial six-year period and annually there-
after. If at any such review it is determined 
that, under the facts and circumstances exist-
ing at that time, that the applicant is no 
longer a wholly dependent person, the appli-
cant may be considered a partly dependent or 
non dependent person and shall be paid such 
benefits as the Commission may determine pur-
suant to Subsection (2)(c)(ii). (emphasis 
added) 
That this is the case is reiterated in U.C.A. § 35-1-68(2)(c)(ii) 
which states: 
Benefits to persons determined to be 
partly dependent pursuant to Subsection 
(2)(b)(iii) shall be determined by the 
Commission in keeping with the circumstances 
and conditions of dependence existing at the 
time of the dependency review and will be paid 
in a weekly amount not exceeding the maximum 
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weekly rate that partly dependent persons 
would receive if wholly dependent. (emphasis 
added) 
The Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter ALJ) did not 
follow the requirement of taking into consideration all facts and 
circumstances that were in existence at the time of the 
hearing. This is evidenced by his statement made to appellant's 
counsel at the time of the hearing: 
Wellf counsel, your point is misplaced. 
Case law provides that dependency is deter-
mined at the time of death. (R. 63) 
Presumably, the ALJ's decision, which was affirmed by 
the Industrial Commission, was based on a misapprehension of the 
law. 
B. The Respondent Webster was not dependent on the workers1 
Compensation dependency benefits of $716.00 per month at the date 
of the earning even without taking into account the principle of 
$85,504.72 in savings. 
The appellant maintains that the standard which should 
be applied in determining dependency is whether the survivor of 
the deceased worker is reliant on the dependency benefits 
received prior to termination of the 312 week period as necessary 
to maintain that dependent in his or her accustomed station in 
life. (See Farnsworth v. Industrial Commission, 534 P.2d 897 
(Ut. 1975) contained in Addendum.) In applying this standard to 
the fact situation, the claimant is not dependent. 
The claimant's stated yearly expenses were $16,024.00. 
(R.87). However, this figure assumed a continued monthly mortage 
payment of $231.00 which actually ended in September of 1985 (R. 
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50-51) and an annual clothing expense of $2,400.00 (R. 48-49, 
87). Even so, the claimant had adequate funds without invading 
the corpus of her $85,504.72 in savings to cover these 
expenses. Her stated yearly income for 1985 plus cash on hand as 
indicated in the most current banking statement (R.91) is sum-
marized as follows: 
1985 
12 months x $493.60 $5,923.20 12 
months x $120.94 1,451.28 
Interest 8,093.33 
Cash on Hand 1,520.87 
TOTAL INCOME $16,996.68 
Stated Expense $16,024.00 
Less 3 months of mortgage 
payments ($3 x $231) . . . . $ 693.00 
EXPENSES $15,331.00 
As can be readily seen, without touching her substantial 
savings and not allowing for the amortization of the mortgage 
which occurred in September of 1985 or questioning the credibi-
lity of a $2,400.00 annual clothing expense, the claimant had 
adequate funds to meet her yearly expenses and maintain her in 
her accustomed station in life in 1985. 
Accordingly, the appellant asserts that the Industrial 
Commission rendered a decision which was not within the limits of 
reasonableness or rationality and the Order of the Industrial 
Commission should be reversed and dependency denied. 
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POINT II 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
WHEN IT FAILED TO SET OUT ANY STANDARD OR GUIDELINE BY 
WHICH TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE CLAIMANT AS A SURVIVOR 
OF A WORKER WHO DIED AS AS RESULT OF AN INDUSTRIAL 
ACCIDENT WAS PARTIALLY DEPENDENT AFTER THE TERMIN-
ATION OF THE 312 WEEK PERIOD. 
In Board of Education of Alpine School District v* 
Olsen, 684 P.2d 49, 51 (Ut. 1984) , this Court stated: 
In reviewing interpretations of general 
questions of law, such as the one before us, 
we apply a correction-of-error standard, with 
no deference to the expertise of the 
Industrial Commission. 
The Court will search vainly for any sort of standard 
applied by either the Industrial Commission or the Administrative 
Law Judge as a test for determining dependency. Instead, the 
Industrial Commission stated in its denial of the appellant's 
Motion for Review in the Record at page 141: 
As there are no legislative guidelines in 
this area, the Commission feels that in this 
particular case the Administrative Law Judge 
fairly fashioned the award of continued 
benefits by taking into account the interest 
income the claimant received from her savings 
and excluding the corpus. The Commission 
finds this to be an equitable compromise 
between the interests of two parties and 
therefore must deny the defendant's first 
motion for review. 
The term "dependency" is not defined in the Utah Code 
and there are no Utah cases determining the meaning of 
"dependency" or "dependent" after the 312 week initial dependency 
period. 
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The case of Farnsworth v. Industrial Commission/ 534 
P.2d 897, 899 (Ut. 1975), defined "dependent" in a case when the 
worker died very close to the time of the industrial accident as 
"one who looks to another for support", and that the true 
criteria of dependency was whether "one has a reasonable 
expectation of continuing or future support to receive such 
contributions as are necessary and needed to maintain him in his 
accustomed station in life." 
Therefore, it is necessary to look to at least the 
claimed expenses of the person claiming dependency and the cir-
cumstances at the time of the dependency hearing to determine if 
the claimant is dependent on the workers' compensation benefits 
being received at the time of the termination of these benefits. 
The Industrial Commission failed to analyze the claimant's 
expenses and her dependency on the workers' compensation 
benefits. In failing to do this and to apply the previously 
mentioned standard, i.e. dependency on the workers' compensation 
benefits, the appellant maintains that the Industrial Commission 
committed reversible error and entered a "compromise" order 
(R.141) which is totally beyond what is contemplated in U.C.A. 
§ 35-1-68. Furthermore, the Commission provided no basis for its 
decision. The weekly compensation figure of $89.50 seems to have 
been pulled from thin air with little or no analysis as to 
respondent's income versus expenses and dependency on the $716.00 
monthly dependency benefit received prior to termination. 
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POINT III 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
WHEN IT REFUSED TO REQUIRE THE RESPONDENT TO USE THE CORPUS OF 
HER SAVINGS OF $85,504.72f AND WHEN IT CONSIDERED ONLY 
THE INTEREST ON THIS AMOUNT. 
In the Administrative Law Judge's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Order, he determined as follows: 
• . . [T]he Administrative Law Judge finds 
that the interest earned by a surviving spouse 
should be included as income, however, the 
applicant should not be forced to invade the 
principle or corpus, in order to meet the 
every day necessities of life. (R.79) 
In addition, the Industrial Commission in the Order 
Denying the Motion for Review filed by the Appellant stated as 
follows in this regard: 
In this case, the issue is narrowed to 
whether or not a claimant need exhaust all 
financial resources before a finding of 
dependency is appropriate. As there are no 
legislative guidelines in this area, the 
Commission feels that, in this particular 
case, the Administrative Law Judge fairly 
fashioned the award of continued benefits by 
taking into account the interest income the 
claimant received from her savings and 
excluding the corpus. (R.141) 
In other words, the Commission held that the claimant 
was not required to utilize any of the corpus of the $85,504.72 
in savings that she had accumulated. This runs directly contrary 
to the authorities available on the subject. 
99 C.J.S. Workmen1s Compensation § 134(2) at page 457 
states as follows with regard to the principle that survivors of 
a workman who has died as a result of an industrial accident are 
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required to look to their own resources: 
• . . [I]t has been held that under 
particular circumstances one who refrains from 
the use of resources reasonably available to 
him for his own support is not dependent on a 
person who is supporting him. One is not a 
dependent who has otherwise reasonable 
support, that is, one cannot be said to be a 
dependent who has sufficient means at hand for 
supplying present necessities judging these 
according to his class and position in life. 
This standard seems to be in accordance with the 
decision in the case of Akin v. Akin Distributors, Inc., 386 P. 2d 
769 (Okl. 1963), (See Addendum) where the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
determined that a mother was not dependent on her deceased child 
when she had an income of $700.00 per month, received income on 
leased property in the amount of $15,000.00*per year, owned stock 
with an estimated value of $50,000.00, one Cadillac automobile 
and eight riding horses. 
The Akin case involves a situation where the decedent 
died immediately following the accident, not a case where there 
was a three and one-half year delay between the time the injured 
employee suffered his accident and the date he died with contin-
uing dependency benefits to his spouse after the date he died. 
Nevertheless, the basic principle is the same, and the claimant 
should be required to look to available assets. The Oklahoma 
Supreme Court considered shares of stock an asset not just the 
dividends. In the instant case, the Industrial Commission 
entered an order which in the Akin case would have required only 
the consideration of dividends and not the underlying stock. 
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Another case which is probably the most closely on point 
is Terrinoni v. Westward Hoi, 418 So.2d 1143 (Fla. App. 1982) 
(See Addendum). In this case, it was initially determined at the 
time of the decedent's death that his mother was dependent upon 
him. However, after she had received $155,000.00 in workers' 
compensation dependency benefits, they were terminated because 
the court below determined that the claimant was not dependent 
upon the workers' compensation death benefits to maintain her 
customary standard of living after receiving these benefits. The 
Florida statute was different than Utah's statute in that it 
allowed dependency to be determined only at the time of the 
employee's death. The Utah statute provides for a second 
determination after the end of the six-year period based on the 
facts and circumstances at the time of the continued dependency 
hearing. The Florida court determined that because the claimant 
had received $155,000.00 in benefits that her dependency 
terminated, and she had sufficient funds to maintain her 
accustomed station in life. Appellant maintains that the same is 
true for the respondent, Mrs. Webster. 
It has been demonstrated in ARGUMENT POINT I that Mrs. 
Webster has enough income without invading principal to maintain 
herself in the style to which she is accustomed. In addition, 
she should be required to use her savings because the test for 
dependency must take into account "all the facts and 
circumstances in existence at the time of the dependency review 
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hearing" (See U.C.A. § 35-1-68). Because the corpus of 
$85,504.72, Mrs. Webster's savings, was not taken into account by 
the Industrial Commission, this requirement was not met. The 
respondent, contrary to well-settled authorities, was not ordered 
to use the resources reasonably available to her. 
By its order, the Industrial Commission has required the 
appellant to finance the building of respondent's substantial 
estate. Appellant maintains that surely no such result was ever 
intended by the legislature, and the order of the Industrial 
Commission is contrary to law and constitutes reversible error. 
POINT IV 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO HOLD OR TAKE JUDICIAL 
NOTICE OF THE FACT THAT AN ANNUAL CLOTHING 
EXPENSE OF $2,400.00 WAS EXCESSIVE. 
The claimant estimated at the time of the hearing and in 
her answers to interrogatories that her yearly clothing expense 
on a stated total annual expense of $16,024.00 (not taking into 
account the fully amortized mortgage in September 198 5) was 
$2,400.00 per year. (R. 49, 87) The appellant-defendant 
maintains that this is so excessive as to shock the conscience, 
and the Commission should have taken judicial notice of this 
fact. The Industrial Commission erred in allowing this total 
expense. 
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POINT V 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
WHEN IT REQUIRED THE APPELLANT TO PAY AMOUNTS BEYOND 
THE EQUIVALENT OF 312 WEEKS OF BENEFITS AS SET OUT IN 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 35-1-68, AND IT REFUSED 
TO ORDER THE SECOND INJURY FUND TO PAY DEPENDENCY 
BENEFITS AFTER THE 312 WEEK PERIOD AS PROVIDED IN 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 3 5-1-70. 
U.C.A. § 35-1-70 states as follows: 
If any wholly dependent persons, who have 
been receiving the benefits of this title, at 
the termination of such benefits are yet in a 
dependent condition, and under all reasonable 
circumstances should be entitled to additional 
benefits, the Industrial Commission may, in 
its discretion, extend indefinetly such bene-
fits; but the liability of the employer or the 
insurance carrier involved shall not be 
extended, and the additional benefits allowed 
shall be paid out of the special fund provided 
for in subdivision (1) of section 35-1-68. 
(U.C.A. § 35-1-68(1) refers to the Second Injury Fund.) 
As provided in U.C.A. § 35-1-70, the Industrial 
Commission did indeed extend dependency benefits of the 
respondent, but when the employer requested that the Second 
Injury Fund pay the continued dependency benefits as provided in 
U.C.A. § 35-1-70, the Second Injury Fund refused (R. 137). 
Furthermore, when the respondent requested the Industrial 
Commission to order the Second Injury Fund to pay, it refused to 
do so (R. 138, 139-141). 
The appellant maintains that the Second Injury Fund and 
the Industrial Commission have both failed to comply with the 
requirements of U.C.A. § 35-1-70. The overwhelming evidence 
shows that the respondent Webster is not dependent and that she 
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has substantial assets to support herself in her "accustomed 
station in life." However if this Court determines that she 
continues to be dependent, the continued dependency benefits past 
the 312-week period should be paid by the Second Injury Fund and 
not the employer. Accordingly, the Appellant requests that the 
Industrial Commission's order be reversed and the Second Injury 
Fund be ordered to pay Mrs. Webster's continuing benefits in the 
event they are upheld. 
CONCLUSION 
It is abundantly clear that the respondent Webster has 
more than enough funds to maintain her in her "accustomed station 
in life" without invading the corpus of the $85,504.74 which 
constitute her savings. 
Nevertheless, if it were necessary for her to do sof 
Utah law suggests and the authorities are clear that all of a 
person's assets who claims to be dependent must be considered 
when determining this issue. The insurer or employer should not 
be required to preserve a substantial estate for the person 
claiming dependency. The accumulation of $85,000.00 would be 
considered by many to constitute affluence. If the Industrial 
Commission's order is carried to its logical extention, a person 
who has millions of dollars of real property or stock could be 
determined to be dependent because he or she would not be 
required to sell any of it. The Industrial Commission's order 
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that Mrs. Webster need not use any of the corpus of her savings 
is contrary to the authority on the issue and is repugnant to 
ordinary common sense. This order should be reversed. 
Finally, U.C.A. § 35-1-70 makes it clear that after the 
initial dependency period of 312 weeks or its equivalent, that 
any additional dependency is to be paid by the Second Injury 
Fund. Nevertheless, the Industrial Commission refused to order 
the Second Injury Fund to pay the additional dependency benefits 
which the ALJ ordered and which the Commission affirmed, thereby 
further constituting error. 
In light of the reasons set out herein, the appellant, 
LDS Hospital, respectfully requests that this .Court reverse the 
decision of the Industrial Commission on the issue of 
dependency. In the alternative, appellant requests that this 
Court order that the continued dependency benefits be paid by the 
Second Injury Fund. 
DATED this of April, 1986. 
Respectfully submitted 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
By: 
Larry R. Jwhite 
A t to rneys for Appe l lan t 
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EXHIBIT A 
35-1-67 LABOR - INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
DECISIONS UNDKR FORMER LAW 
Retroactive application of 1971 amend* man" against which a percentage of disabil-
ment. ity should be applied; 1971 amendment sub-
In paragraph dealing with injuries not stituting "312 weeks" for "two hundred 
specified, former language "not exceeding in weeks" was in the nature of a clarification or 
any case two hundred weeks" simply stated amplification so that application of percent-
a limitation of 200 weeks on any award and a £ e o f disability to 312 weeks in award gov-
was not intended to represent the "whole erned by statute prior to 1971 amendment 
was not an improper retroactive application 
of the amendment. Oakland Constr. Co. v. 
Industrial Comm. (1974) 520 P 2d 208. 
35-1-67. Permanent total disability — Amount of payments — Vocational 
rehabilitation — Procedure and payments. In cases of permanent total disability 
the employee shall receive 66 % % of his average weekly wages at the time of the 
injury, but not more than a maximum of 85% of the state average weekly wage 
at the time of the injury per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per week 
plus $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent minor child under the 
age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four dependent minor children not to exceed 
the average weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury, but not to 
exceed 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week. 
However, in no case of permanent total disability shall the employer or its insur-
ance carrier be required to pay weekly compensation payments for more than 312 
weeks. A finding by the commission of permanent total disability shall in all cases 
be tentative and not final until such time as the following proceedings have been 
had: If the employee has tentatively been found to be permanently and totally dis-
abled, it shall be mandatory that the industrial commission of Utah refer the 
employee to the division of vocational rehabilitation under the state board of edu-
cation for rehabilitation training and it shall be the duty of the commission to 
order paid to the vocational rehabilitation division, out of the second injury fund 
provided for by Subsection 35-1-68 (1), not to exceed $1,000 for use in the rehabilita-
tion and training of the employee; the rehabilitation and training of the employee 
shall generally follow the practice applicable under Section 35-1-69, relating to the 
rehabilitation of employees having combined injuries. If the division of vocational 
rehabilitation under the state board of education certifies to the industrial commis-
sion of Utah in writing that the employee has fully cooperated with the division 
of vocational rehabilitation in its efforts to rehabilitate him, and in the opinion 
of the division the employee may not be rehabilitated, the commission shall order 
that there be paid to the employee weekly benefits at the rate of 66 % % of his 
average weekly wages at the time of the injury, but not more than a maximum 
of 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and 
not less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 
for each dependent minor child under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of 
four dependent minor children not to exceed the average weekly wage of the 
employee at the time of the injury, but not to exceed 85% of the state average 
weekly wage at the time of the injury per week out of the second injury fund pro-
vided for by Subsection 35-1-68 (1), for such period of time beginning with the time 
that the payments,as in this section provided, to be made by the employer or its 
insurance carrier terminate and ending with the death of the employee. No 
employee shall be entitled to any such benefits if he fails or refuses to cooperate 
with the division of vocational rehabilitation under this section. 
All persons who are permanently and totally disabled and entitled to benefits 
from the second injury fund under Subsection 35-1-68 (1), including those injured 
prior to March 6, 1949, shall receive not less than [$443] $120 per week when paid 
only by the second injury fund, or when combined with compensation payments 
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of the employer or the insurance carrier. The division of vocational rehabilitation 
shall, at the termination of the vocational training of the employee, certify to the 
industrial commission of Utah the work the employee is qualified to perform, and 
thereupon the commission shall, after notice to the employer and an opportunity 
to be heard, determine whether the employee has, notwithstanding such rehabilita-
tion, sustained a loss of bodily function. 
The loss or permanent and complete loss of use of both hands or both arms, or 
both feet or both legs, or both eyes, or of any two thereof, constitutes total and 
permanent disability, to be compensated according to the provisions of this section 
and no tentative finding of permanent total disability is required in those 
instances. In all other cases where there has been rehabilitation effected but where 
there is some loss of bodily function, the award shall be based upon partial perma-
nent disability. 
In no case shall the employer or the insurance carrier be required to pay compen-
sation for any combination of disabilities of any kind as provided in Sections 
35-1-65, 35-1-66 and this section, including loss of function, in excess of 85% of the 
state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week for 312 weeks. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 78; C.L. 1917, 
§3139; L. 1919, ch. 63, § 1; R.S. 1933, 42-1-63: 
L. 1937, ch. 41, § 1; 1939, ch. 51, § 1; C. 1943, 
42-1-63; L. 1945, ch. 65, § 1; 1949, ch. 52, § 1 
1951, ch. 55, § 1; 1955, ch. 57, § 1; 1957, ch. 62, 
§ 1; 1959, ch. 55, § 1; 1961, ch. 71, § 1; 1963, ch, 
49, § 1; 1965, ch. 68, § 1; 1967, ch. 65, § 1; 1969, 
ch. 86, § 5; 1971, ch. 76, § 6; 1973, ch. 67, § 4; 
1974, ch. 13, §1; 1975, ch. 101, §5; 1977, ch 
150, §1; 1977, ch. 151, §3; 1977, ch. 156, §6; 
1979, ch. 138, § 2; 1981, ch. 286, § 1; 1983, ch. 
356, § 1; 1985, ch. 160, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1975 amendment substituted "85% of 
the state average weekly wage" for "66 % % 
of the state average weekly wage" four times 
in the first paragraph and once in the last 
paragraph; increased the minimum benefit 
per week from $35 to $45 in the first para-
graph; inserted "not to exceed the average 
weekly wage of the employee at the time of 
the injury" twice in the first paragraph; 
increased the benefit per week from $50 to 
$60 at the end of the third paragraph 
(deleted by the 1977 amendment) and near 
the end of the fourth paragraph (deleted by 
the 1977 amendment); and substituted "July 
1, 1975" for "July 1, 1974" in the fourth para-
graph (deleted by the 1977 amendment). 
The 1977 amendment by chapter 151 sub-
stituted "spouse" for "wife" in the first para-
graph. 
The 1977 amendment by chapter 156 made 
the same changes as the 1977 amendment by 
chapter 151; combined the first two para-
graphs into one paragraph; inserted the sec-
ond paragraph; and deleted the former third 
and fourth paragraphs which read: "Com-
mencing July 1, 1971, all persons who are 
permanently and totally disabled and on that 
date or prior thereto were receiving compen-
sation benefits from the special fund pro-
vided for by section 35-1-68(1) shall be paid 
compensation benefits at the rate of $60 per 
week. 
"Commencing July 1, 1975, all persons who 
were permanently and totally disabled on or 
before March 5, 1949, and were receiving 
compensation benefits and continue to 
receive such benefits shall be paid compensa-
tion benefits from the special fund provided 
for by section 35-1-68 (1) at a rate sufficient 
to bring their weekly benefit to $60 when 
combined with employer or insurance carrier 
compensation payments." 
The 1977 amendment by chapter 150, in the 
two paragraphs deleted by the 1977 amend-
ment by chapter 156 (quoted above) substi-
tuted "1977" for "1971" and "1975" and 
substituted "$75" for "$60." 
The 1979 amendment increased the mini-
mum benefit in the second paragraph from 
$75 to $85. 
The 1981 amendment substituted "second 
injury fund" for "special fund" throughout 
the section; and increased the amount in the 
second paragraph from $85 to $100. 
The 1983 amendment substituted "under 
this section" at the end of the first para-
graph for "as set forth herein"; increased the 
minimum amount in the first sentence of the 
second paragraph from $100 to $110; and 
made minor changes in phraseology, punctu-
ation and style. 
Effective Date. 
Section 2 of Laws 1985, ch. 160 provided: 
"This act takes effect upon approval by the 
governor, or the day following the constitu-
tional time limit of Article VII, Sec. 8 with-
out the governor's signature, or in the case 
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of a veto, the date of veto override." employee's claim filed in December of 1982 
Approved March 18, 1985. for permanent total disability resulting from 
Prior accidents contributing to disability. f™ deterioration of a condition caused by 
_ , . 1961 injury was timely filed under this sec-
Employee who was permanently and
 t i o n and> u n d e r 3 5 . ^ i n d u s t r i a I c o m m i s -
totally disabled due to a combination of prior
 s i o n h a d c o n t i n u i n g jurisdiction to award 
and present accidents was entitled to lifetime
 p e r m a n e n t t o t a , disability compensation, 
benefits payable from the special fund pro-
 M e c h a m v I n d u s t r i a l C o m m . of U t a h (1984) 
vided for in 35-1-68. McPhie v. Industrial CQO p OA 7«Q 
Comm. (1977) 567 P 2d 153. ^ V * ™" 
Statute of limitations. T o t a l disability. 
This section governs permanent total dis- Where an employee demonstrates that he 
ability claims and contains no statute of lim- can no longer perform his normal duties as 
itations for such claims; therefore, where a result of a work-related accident, and that 
employee suffered an injury in October of he cannot be rehabilitated, the burden shifts 
1961 and notice of injury and claim was prop- to the employer to prove that suitable, steady 
erly given and filed in accordance with w°rk is available, considering the age, men-
requirements of 35-1-99 and 35-1-100, and tal capacity, and education of the employee, 
employee was found to have suffered perma- m order to preclude a determination of total 
nent partial disability and received 40 weeks and permanent disability under the odd-lot 
of compensation through December of 1964 doctrine. Marshall v. Industrial Comm. of 
and payment of medical bill through 1966, Utah (1984) 681 P 2d 208. 
35-1-68. Second Injury Fund — Injury causing death — Burial expenses 
— No dependents, payments to Default Indemnity Fund — Payments to depen-
dents. (1) There is created a Second Injury Fund for the purpose of making pay-
ments in accordance with Chapters 1 and 2 of this title. This fund shall succeed 
to all monies heretofore held in that fund designated as the "Special Fund" or the 
"Combined Injury Fund" and whenever reference is made elsewhere in this code 
to the "Special Fund" or the "Combined Injury Fund" that reference shall be 
deemed to be to the Second Injury Fund. The state treasurer shall be the custodian 
of the Second Injury Fund and the commission shall direct its distribution. Reason-
able administration assistance may be paid from the proceeds of that fund. The 
attorney general shall appoint a member of his staff to represent the Second Injury 
Fund in all proceedings brought to enforce claims against it. 
(2) If injury causes death within the period of six years from the date of the 
accident, the employer or insurance carrier shall pay the burial expenses of the 
deceased as provided in Section 35-1-81, and further benefits in the amounts and 
to the persons as follows: 
(a) If the commission has made a determination that there are no dependents 
of the deceased, it may, prior to a lapse of one year from the date of death of 
a deceased employee, issue a temporary order for the employer or insurance carrier 
to pay into the Default Indemnity Fund the sum of $30,000. When the amount in 
the Default Indemnity Fund reaches or exceeds $500,000, the $30,000 shall thereaf-
ter be paid into the Second Injury Fund. If the amount in the Default Indemnity 
Fund falls below $500,000 at any time after reaching the initial $500,000, the com-
mission shall direct payments into either the Second Injury Fund or the Default 
Indemnity Fund as may be required so as to maintain the Default Indemnity Fund 
at or near $500,000. Before payment into either fund, the $30,000 shall be reduced 
by the amount of any weekly compensation payments paid to or due the deceased 
between the date of the accident and death. If a dependency claim is filed subse-
quent to the issuance of such an order and, thereafter, a determination of depen-
dency is made by the commission, the award shall first be paid out of the sum 
deposited for credit to the Default Indemnity Fund or the Second Injury Fund by 
the employer or insurance carrier before any further claim may be asserted against 
the employer or insurance carrier. If no dependency claim is filed within one year 
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from the date of death, the commission's temporary order shall become permanent 
and final. If no temporary order has been issued and no claim for dependency has 
been filed within one year from the date of death, the commission may issue a 
permanent order at any time requiring the carrier or employer to pay $30,000 into 
the Second Injury Fund Any claim for compensation by a dependent must be filed 
with the commission within one year from the date of death of the deceased. 
(b) (i) If there are wholly dependent persons at the time of the death, the pay-
ment by the employer or insurance carrier shall be 66 % % of the decedent's aver-
age weekly wage at the time of the injury, but not more than a maximum of 85% 
of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not less 
than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each 
dependent minor child under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four such 
dependent minor children not to exceed the average weekly wage of the employee 
at the time of the injury, but not to exceed 85% of the state average weekly wage 
at the time of the injury per week, to continue during dependency for the remain-
der of the period between the date of the death and not to exceed six years or 
312 weeks after the date of the injury. 
(ii) The weekly payment to wholly dependent persons during dependency follow-
ing the expiration of the first six-year period described in Subsection (2)(b)(i) shall 
be an amount equal to the weekly benefits paid to those wholly dependent persons 
during that initial six-year period, reduced by 50% of any weekly federal social 
security death benefits paid to those wholly dependent persons. 
(iii) The issue of dependency shall be subject to review by the commission at 
the end of the initial six-year period and annually thereafter. If in any such review 
it is determined that, under the facts and circumstances existing at that time, the 
applicant is no longer a wholly dependent person, the applicant may be considered 
a partly dependent or non dependent person and shall be paid such benefits as the 
commission may determine pursuant to Subsection (2)(c)(ii). 
(iv) For purposes of any dependency determination, a surviving spouse of a 
deceased employee shall be conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for a six-
year period from the date of death of the employee. This presumption shall not 
apply after the initial six-year period and, in determining the then existing annual 
income of the surviving spouse, the commission shall exclude 50% of any federal 
social security death benefits received by that surviving spouse. 
(c) (i) If there are partly dependent persons at the time of the death, the pay-
ment shall be 66 % % of the decedent's average weekly wages at the time of the 
injury, but not more than a maximum of 85% of the state average weekly wage 
at the time of the injury per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per week, 
to continue during dependency for the remainder of the period between the date 
of death and not to exceed six years or 312 weeks after the date of injury as the 
commission in each case may determine and shall not amount to more than a maxi-
mum of $30,000. The benefits provided for in this subsection shall be in keeping 
with the circumstances and conditions of dependency existing at the date of injury, 
and any amount awarded by the commission under this subsection must be consist-
ent with the general provisions of this title. 
(ii) Benefits to persons determined to be partly dependent pursuant to Subsec-
tion (2)(b)(iii) shall be determined by the commission in keeping with the circum-
stances and conditions of dependency existing at the time of the dependency review 
and may be paid in a weekly amount not exceeding the maximum weekly rate that 
partly dependent person would receive if wholly dependent. 
(iii) Payments under this section shall be paid to such persons during their 
dependency by the employer or insurance carrier. 
(d) If there are wholly dependent persons and also partly dependent persons 
at the time of death, the commission may apportion the benefits as it deems just 
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and equitable; provided, that the total benefits awarded to all parties concerned 
shall not exceed the maximum provided for by law. 
(e) If there are wholly or partly dependent persons at the time of death and 
the total amount of the awards paid by the employer or its insurance carrier to 
said dependents, prior to the termination of dependency, including any remarriage 
settlement, does not exceed $30,000, the employer or its insurance carrier shall pay 
the difference between the amount paid and $30,000 into the Second Injury Fund 
provided for in Subsection (1). 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 79; C.L. 1917, 
§ 3140; L. 1921, ch. 67, § 1; R.S. 1933, 42-1-64; 
L. 1937, ch. 41, § 1; 1939, ch. 51, § 1; C. 1943, 
42-1-64; L. 1945, ch. 65, § 1; 1949, ch. 52, § 1; 
1951, ch. 55, § 1; 1955, ch. 57, § 1; 1957, ch. 62, 
§ 1; 1959, ch. 55, § 1; 1961, ch. 71, § 1; 1963, ch. 
49, § 1; 1965, ch. 68, § 1; 1967, ch. 65, § 1; 1969, 
ch. 86, § 6; 1971, ch. 76, § 7; 1973, ch. 67, § 5; 
1975, ch. 101, § 6; 1977, ch. 151, § 4; 1977, ch. 
156, § 7; 1979, ch. 138, § 3; 1984, ch. 80, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1975 amendment added the last two 
sentences to subsec. (1) (deleted in 1979); sub-
stituted "85% of the state average weekly 
wage" for "66 % % of the state average 
weekly wage" in subds. (2)(b)(i), (2)(c)(i) and 
former subsec. (5) (deleted in 1979); increased 
the minimum benefit per week from $35 to 
$45 in subds. (2)(b)(i), (2)(c)(i) and former 
subsec. (5) (deleted in 1979); and inserted 
"not to exceed the average weekly wage of 
the employee at the time of the injury" after 
"four such dependent minor children" in 
subd. (2)(b)(i). 
The 1977 amendment by chapter 151 sub-
stituted "spouse" for "wife" near the middle 
ofsubd. (2)(b)(i). 
The 1977 amendment by chapter 156 made 
the same change as the 1977 amendment by 
chapter 151; substituted "in section 35-1-81" 
near the beginning of present subsec. (2) for 
"herein"; and added the last sentence of 
former subsec. (4) (deleted in 1979) relating 
to reviewing the issue of dependency at the 
time application was made for additional 
benefits from the special fund. 
The 1979 amendment inserted subsec. (1); 
designated the former introductory para-
graph as subsec. (2); substituted subd. (2)(a) 
for former subd. (1) which read: "If there are 
no dependents, the employer and insurance 
carrier shall pay into the state treasury the 
sum of $15,600. Any claim for compensation 
must be filed with the commission within one 
year from the date of death of the deceased, 
and, if at the end of one year from the date 
of death of the deceased, no claim for com-
pensation shall have been filed with the com-
mission, the said sum of $15,600 shall be paid 
at that time into the state treasury by the 
employer or the insurance carrier. This pay-
ment shall be reduced by the amount of any 
weekly compensation payments paid to or 
due the deceased between the date of the 
accident and his death. Such payment shall 
be held in a special fund for the purposes 
provided in this title; the state treasurer 
shall be the custodian of such special fund, 
and the commission shall direct the distribu-
tion thereof. If the commission has reason-
ably determined that there are no 
dependents of the deceased, it may order the 
employer or insurance carrier to pay into the 
state treasury the sum specified in this sub-
section to be held in that special fund for a 
period of one year from the death of the 
deceased. Any claim filed within that year 
for which an award is made by the commis-
sion shall be paid out of the sum deposited 
by the employer or insurance carrier before 
any further claim may be asserted against 
the employer or insurance carrier"; 
redesignated former subsec. (2) as subd. 
(2)(b)(i); inserted "by the employer or insur-
ance carrier" after "payment" near the 
beginning of subd. (2)(b)(i); added subds. 
(2)(b)(ii) to (2)(b)(iv); redesignated former 
subsec. (3) as subd. (2)(c)(i); added subds. 
(2)(c)(ii) and (2)(c)(iii); redesignated former 
subsec. (4) as subd. (2)(d); deleted the last 
two sentences of former subsec. (4) which 
provided that the employer or insurance car-
rier would pay benefits to dependents out of 
the special fund as provided by former 
subsecs. (2) and (3), and to review the issue 
of dependency at the time application was 
made for additional benefits from the special 
fund; deleted former subsec. (5) which pro-
vided benefits to dependents at the rate of 
66 Vz % of the deceased's average weekly 
wages at the time of the injury, but not more 
than 85% of the state average weekly wage, 
with a minimum of $45 per week out of the 
special fund beginning with the time that 
payments made by the employer or its insur-
ance carrier terminate and ending upon the 
termination of said dependency; redesignated 
former subsec. (6) as subd. (2)(e); increased 
the maximum award in subd. (2)(e) from 
$15,600 to $18,720; and substituted "second 
injury fund" for "special fund" at the end of 
subd. (2)(e). 
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hired and regularly employed elsewhere, 
to pay into the special fund, provided by 
this section and 35-1-70, the amount pro-
vided by 35 1-68, if she leaves no depend-
ents. United Airlines Transport Corp. v. 
Industrial Comm., 110 U. 590, 175 P. 2d 
752, 
CoUateral Keferences. 
Workmen's CompensationC=867. 
99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 304. 
Compensation ns affected by external in-
fection from, or subsequent incident of, 
original injury, 7 A. L. E. 1186, 102 A. L. 
R. 790. 
Construction and effect of provisions in 
relation to new or new and further disa-
bility, 72 A. L. R. 1125. 
Previous loss or mutilation of member 
as affecting amount or basis of compensa-
tion under Workmen's Compensation Act, 
30 A. L. R. 979. 
Right to compensation for new or aggra-
vated injury as result of medical or surgi-
cal treatment, 127 A. L. R. 1108. 
Settlement of claim or recovery against 
physician or surgeon or one responsible for 
his malpractice on account of aggravation 
of injury as affecting right to compensa-
tion, 98 A. L. R. 1392. 
35-1-70. Additional benefits in special cases.—If any wholly dependent 
persons, who have been receiving the benefits of this title, at the termi-
nation of such benefits are yet in a dependent condition, and under all 
reasonable circumstances should be entitled to additional benefits, the 
industrial commission may, in its discretion, extend indefinitely such bene-
fits; but the liability of the employer or insurance carrier involved shall 
not be extended, and the additional benefits allowed shall be paid out of 
the special fund provided for in subdivision (1) of section 35-1-68. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, §79; C. L. tive intent to require an employer -whose 
1917, § 3140, subsec. 7; L. 1921, ch. 67, § 1; 
E. S. 1933 & C. 1943, 42-1-66. 
Definitions. 
Word "employer" is used in this section 
to encompass an employer in a situation 
where the employment status is localized 
in Utah. United Airlines Transport Corp. 
v. Industrial Comm., 110 U. 590, 175 P. 2d 
752. 
Duty to pay into special fund. 
This chapter does not evidence legisla-
employee is killed while temporarily en-
gaged* in employment in Utah, although 
hired and regularly employed elsewhere, 
to pay into the special fund, provided by 
35-1-69 and by this section, the amount 
provided by 35-1-68, if she leaves no de-
pendents. United Airlines Transport Corp. 
v. Industrial Comm., 110 U. 590, 175 P. 2d 
752. 
Collateral References. 
Workmen's CompensationC^SSG. 
99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 296. 
35-1-71. Dependents—Presumption.—The following persons shall be 
presumed to be wholly dependent for support upon a deceased employee: 
(1) A wife upon a husband with whom she lives at the time of his 
death. 
(2) Children under the age of eighteen years or over such age, if 
physically or mentally incapacitated, upon the parent, with whom they 
are living at the time of the death of such parent, or who is legally 
bound for their support. 
In all other cases, the question of dependency, in whole or in part, 
shall be determined in accordance with the facts in each particular case 
existing at the time of the injury resulting in the death of such em-
ployee, but no person shall be considered as a dependent unless he is a 
member of the family of the deceased employee, or bears to him the 
relation of husband or wife, lineal descendant, ancestor, or brother or 
sister. The word "child" as used in this title shall include a posthumous 
child, and a child legally adopted prior to the injury. Half brothers and 
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CASE No.85000250 
ANNA WEBSTER, Widow of 
GENE WEBSTER, deceased, 
Applicant, 
vs. 
L.D.S. HOSPITAL 
(SELF-INSURED), 
Defendant 
* * * * * * * * * * * * 
HEARING: Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160 
East Broadway, Salt Lake City, Utah, on June 26, 1985, 
at 8:30 a.m.; same being pursuant to Order and Notice 
of the Commission. 
BEFORE: Timothy C. Allen, Administrative Law Judge. 
APPEARANCES: The Applicant was present and represented by Virginius 
Dabney, Attorney at Law. 
The Defendant was present and represented by Larry 
White, Attorney at Law. 
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the parties requested 
that the Administrative Law Judge take the matter under advisement until June 
28, at noon, to allow them an opportunity to reach a settlement of the case. 
No settlement having been received by noon on June 28, 1985, the 
Administrative Law Judge is prepared to enter the follow. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
The Applicant herein, Anna Webster, is the widow of Gene Webster, who 
sustained a fatal industrial injury on July 20, 1979, while in the course or 
scope of his employment with the defendant, L.D.S. Hospital. The injured 
worker eventually died from his injuries on December 15, 1982. On January 26, 
1983, the Industrial Commission entered an Order providing for the payment of 
death benefits to the surviving spouse of the deceased, Anna Webster, the 
Applicant herein. As the result of that Order, the Applicant was paid death 
benefits at the rate of $179.00 per week through March 20, 1985, by the 
Defendant. 
On or about March 15, 1985, the Applicant filed an application for 
continuing death benefits from the Defendant, pursuant to Section 35-1-68, 
Utah Code Annotated. 
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Section 35-1-68 (b)(iv) provides that "...In determining the then 
existing annual income of the surviving spouse, the Commission shall exclude 
501 of any Social Security Death Benefits received by that surviving spouse." 
The Applicant's present income consists of the $479.00 per month she receives 
from Social Security for a disability award due to her rheumatoid arthritis, 
and $120.00 per month which she receives from the L.D.S. Hospital retirement 
plan. Prior to the termination of the benefits by the Defendant, she was also 
receiving $716.00 in compensation benefits, for a total monthly income of 
$1,315.00. The Applicant's expenses are approximately $1,300.00. As the 
result of the death of her husband, the Applicant collected $36,000.00 in life 
insurance proceeds, and as the result of the death of her mother, she received 
$9,000.00. The Applicant testified that she has $85,000.00 in money market 
certificates. As the result of those certificates, the Applicant earned 
approximately $8,000.00 last year in interest income. However, she did not 
invade any of her savings until the Defendant terminated her benefits, 
whereupon she spent $2,600.00 of her savings. It was also revealed that the 
Applicant would be paying off her mortgage in September of 1985, and 
accordingly would no longer have that monthly expense. 
Without considering the interest income, it would appear at first 
blush that the Applicant would be wholly dependant on the benefits provided by 
the Defendant, since they constitute over one half of her monthly income. The 
Defendant, by and through counsel, has taken the position that the Applicant 
should place her $85*000.00 in high yielding annuities, and that by doing so, 
she would realize a higher income than she receives from her money market 
certificates. However, the Administrative Law Judge feels that the Defendant, 
is missing the point. The point being, that it is not the Applicant's 
responsibility to find the highest yielding investment so that the insurance 
carrier may be benefited. However, the Administrative Law Judge does feel 
that the interest income should be considered in determining the Applicant's 
disposable income. In other words, the Administrative Law Judge finds that 
the interest earned by a surviving spouse should be included as income, 
however the Applicant should not be forced to invade the principal or corpus, 
in order to meet the everyday necessities of life. After considering all of 
the evidsnce on the file, Lhe Administracive Law Judge feels that the fairest 
finding in this case, would be a finding of partial dependency. Further, the 
Administrative Law Judge finds that the Defendant should pay the Applicant 
$89.50 per week or $358.00 every four weeks which sum represents one half of 
the allowance for full dependency. 
With respect to the annual dependency review called for in Section 68 
of the Act, the Defendant shall send an Affidavit of Dependency form, which 
will be promulgated by the Commission in the near future, to the Applicant. 
The form should be sent at least sixty (60) days prior to the one (1) year 
anniversary of the date of this Order. The form will be sent to the defendant 
and the Industrial Commission by Mrs. Webster. The Defendant shall not 
suspend or terminate benefits to Mrs. Webster after the anniversary date of 
this order, unless the Affidavit of Dependency indicates a significant change 
in her income level, either by increasing or decreasing. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
Anna Webster is now partially dependent for support purposes. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant, L.D.S. Hospital 
(Self-Insured) pay Anna Webster, compensation at the rate of $89.50 per week, 
commencing effective March 21, 1985, and continuing until further order of the 
Commission. 
IT is FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant, L.D.S. Hospital (Self Insured), 
shall send a Dependency Affidavit form to Anna Webster no later than sixty 
(60) days from the anniversary date of this Order. In the event there has 
been a substantial increase in Mrs. Websters1 income, then the defendant may 
terminate benefits after the anniversary date of this Order, and the Applicant 
shall be entitled to a hearing before the Industrial Commission. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing 
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof 
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and unless so filed 
this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. 
y ^ ^ Timothy C. A l l e ^ ^ 
^^ Adminisp^a*ftfe/Law Judge 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
2 day of July, 1985 
ATTEST: 
/s/ Linda J. Strasburg 
Linda J. Strasburg 
Commission Secretary 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on July _2
 f 1985 a copy of the attached Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order was mailed to the following persons at 
the following addresses, postage paid: 
Anna Webster, 3864 South 850 West, Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Yirginius Dabney, Attorney, 412 Reams Building, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84101 
Scott Wetzel Services, 833 East 400 South Suite 104, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84102 
Larry White, Attorney, 330 South 300 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
By Barbara 
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ANNA WEBSTER, Widow of 
GENE WEBSTER, Deceased, 
Applicant, 
VS. 
L.D.S. HOSPITAL (Self-insured), 
Defendant* 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
On July 2, 1985, an Administrative Law Judge of the Commission issued 
an Order requiring the Defendant in the above-captioned case to pay continued 
dependency death benefits to the widow/claims^'., Anna Webster. The Defendant 
filed two separate Motions for Review assert g two different defenses. The 
first Motion for Review, filed August 28, 19 , argues that the widow/claimant 
is not a dependent because of the other financial resources available to her. 
The second Motion for Review, filed October 8, 1985, argues that if the 
Commission should find that the claimant was a dependent of the deceased, that 
the additional dependency death benefits should be paid out of the Second 
Injury Fund, and not by the Defendant Self-insured Employer. The Commission 
is of th^opinion that both Motions for Review should be denied. A review of 
the file follows. 
On July 20, 1979, the now-deceased husband of the claimant sustained 
multiple injuries to the head and body in a motorcycle accident which occurred 
while he was making a delivery for the Defendant while in the course of his 
employment. The Defendant Self-insured Employer began the payment of 
temporary total disability benefits in August of 1979. On February 23, 1981, 
these benefits were changed to permanent total disability benefits because of 
a physician report prepared by Dr. Robert Baer which indicated that the 
condition of the claimant's husband continued to deteriorate. On December 15, 
1982, the claimant's husband died due to complications associated with the 
accident-caused arteriosclerotic cerebrovascular disease. On January 10, 
1983, the claimant filed an application for death benefits. On January 26, 
1983, the Commission issued an Order requiring the Defendant to pay an 
additional 116 weeks of benefits at $179.00 per week. These ordered benefits, 
added to the already-paid 196 weeks of benefits, amounted to 312 weeks of 
death benefits at the maximum rate of $179.00 per week. 
Based on the January 16, 1983, Order, the Defendant continued to pay 
benefits to the claimant through March of 1985. In February of 1985, the 
claimant wrote a letter to the Second Injury Fund seeking information re-
garding continued benefits after the initial 312 weeks paid by the Defendant. 
The Second Injury Fund responded to her, in a letter dated March A, 1985, that 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* ORDER DENYING 
* 
* MOTION FOR REVIEW 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* * * * * 
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due to the May 1979 amendment to U.C.A. 35-1-68, the employer/carrier, and not 
the Second Injury Fund, was liable for any additional dependency benefits 
beyond the initial 312 weeks. Consequently, on March 15, 1985, the claimant 
filed an Application for Hearing to have the matter regarding continued 
benefits determined by an Administrative Law Judge. The Defendant answered 
the Application stating that the Defendant had already paid the 312 weeks of 
benefits specified in U.C.A. 35-1-68, and therefore, should not be liable for 
any additional benefits* 
On June 26, 1985, the hearing was held. On July 2, 1985, the 
Administrative Law Judge issued his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order awarding the claimant continued dependency benefits to be paid by the 
Defendant Self-insured Employer. The benefits were computed to be $89.50 per 
week, which amounted to one half the maximum rate of $179.00 per week which 
the Defendant paid to the claimant during the initial 312 weeks. In deter-
mining the amount of benefits to be paid by the Defendant, the Administrative 
Law Judge took into consideration income the claimant was receiving from other 
sources as compared against her regular living expenses. Other income in-
cluded Social Security benefits she aceived for her own rheumatoid arthritis, 
retirement benefits due her deceai '. husband from the Defendant, and interest 
she earned on a money market account with a corpus of $85,000.00. The 
Administrative Law Judge found that the claimant should not be required to 
invade the corpus of the money market account in order • to meet her living 
expenses, and also ordered the continued benefits to be paid until a 
substantial change in the claimant's dependency status occurred. 
On August 28, 1985, the Defendant filed the first Motion for Review. 
That Motion for Review objects to the Administrative Law Judge's finding that 
the claimant should not be required to invade the corpus of her money market 
account* The Motion argues that, at the time of the hearing, the claimant 
should not have been considered a dependent, as she had sufficient resources 
to provide for her necessities without the benefit of continued workers' 
compensation death benefits. The Defendant further argues that the 
Administrative Law Judge failed to take into consideration the reduction of 
her expenses which would occur in October 1985 due to her completing the 
payments for the mortgage on her home. The Defendant points out that once the 
mortgage was paid off, the claimant could pay all her listed expenses without 
the continued benefits, and without ever invading the corpus of her savings. 
The Defendant argues that based on these considerations, the Administrative 
Law Judge should have denied the claimant continued death benefits as she was 
not dependent on outside income. 
On October 8, 1985, the Defendant wrote a letter to the Second Injury 
Fund requesting the Second Injury Fund to agree to pay the continued death 
benefits ordered by the Administrative Law Judge in the July 2, 1985, Order. 
This request was denied by the Second Injury Fund on October 3, 1985. Once 
again the Second Injury Fund pointed out that the May 1979 amendment to U.C.A. 
35-1-68 relieved the Second Injury Fund for the previously specified liability 
for continued death benefits beyond the initial 312 weeks. On October 18, 
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 f the Defendant presented the Commission with a request to overrule the 
Administrative Law Judge, and order the continued benefits to be paid out of 
the Second Injury Fund. 
Regarding the Defendants first Motion for Review, the Commission 
notes that the issue arises due to the lack of a concrete definition of 
dependency as specified in the Workers* Compensation Act. In this case, the 
issue is narrowed to whether or not a claimant need exhaust all financial 
resources before a finding of dependency is appropriate. As there are no 
legislative guidelines in this area, the Commission feels that in this 
particular case, the Administrative Law Judge fairly fashioned the award of 
continued benefits by taking into account the interest income the claimant 
received from her savings and excluding the corpus. The Commission finds this 
to be an equitable compromise between the interests of the two parties, and 
therefore, must deny the Defendant*s first Motion for Review. 
The Defendant*s second Motion for Review must also be denied. The 
Commission is satisfied that the intend of the legislature*s May 1979 
amendment to U,C.A. 35-1-68 was to relif the increasing financial burden 
placed on the Second Injury Fund. The legislature provided this relief by 
deleting the language in U.C.A. 35-1-68 specifying that the Second Injury Fund 
would be liable for continued dependency benefits. The code section which the 
Defendant feels contradicts this interpretation (U.C.A. 35-1-70) by specifying 
a 312-week limitation on benefits from the carrier is not applicable to 
continuei^dependency death benefits. That section applies to "special cases'9 
which are not specifically provided for by other code sections. As the 
Commission finds no clear contradiction in the reading of U.C.A. 35-1-68, and 
U.C.A* 35-1-10, the Defendant's second Motion for Review is also denied. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Defendants Motions for Review 
submitted on August 28, 1985, and October 8, 1985, are denied and the 
Administrative Law Judge's Order dated July 2, 1985, is hereby affirmed. 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah. Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
T^r: day of January, 1986. 
ATTEST: 
Stephen M. Hadley, ChairmanX 
\ \ 
.Jbuicu 
6 
££<~>C'£t? Ast~&f 
Walter T. Axelgard, Cprfumissioner 
&^S^J 
ssioner 
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I certify that on January )C 1986, a copy of the attached 
Order Denying Motion for Review in the case of Anna Webster issued 
January 9 , 1986 , was mailed to the following persons at the following 
addresses, postage paid: 
Erie V, Boorman, Administrator 
Second Injury Fund 
P.O. Box 45580 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0580 
Virginius Dabney, Attorney at Law 
412 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Anna Webster 
3864 South 850 West 
Bountiful, UT 84010 
Scott Wetzel Services 
833 East 400 South, Suite 104 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
''"tarry White, Attorney at Law 
330 South 300 EAst 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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equipping a help-your-self laundry, it is 
conceivable that a seller of washing ma-
chines might be willing to reduce the price 
of such articles in that situation although 
the purchaser's purpose be not that of re-
sale of the articles. To draw a distinction 
in the purchaser's intended use of the 
articles bought seems unsatisfactory as such 
appears of small significance to the seller. 
The evidence here is equally inconclusive. 
One gets the impression that "usual retail 
price" is an indefinite term. We cannot say 
that the evidence defined the intention of 
the parties to the contract in using the 
term with greater clarity than this court 
defined it as applied to Sec. 93. 
In Stemmons, Inc. v. Universal C. I. T. 
Credit Corporation, Okl., 301 P.2d 212, 216, 
we held that "ordinary course of trade" as 
used in 46 O.S. 1951 § 93 applied to a sale 
by one automobile dealer to another if 
such sale was in the seller's ordinary course 
of trade, whether the sale be retail or 
wholesale, and pointed out that Sec. 93, 
supra, does not require that the purchaser 
be an innocent purchaser or without knowl-
edge of the mortgage, but only that the 
property be sold in the ordinary course of 
trade. 
[5,6] We are of the opinion that the 
language of the statute, supra, was intended 
by the Legislature to encompass all transac-
tions between persons who, in their ordi-
nary business dealings, effected a sale and 
purchase for a consideration sufficient to 
support a simple contract. Had the Legis-
lature intended that transactions in the 
ordinary course of trade be limited to sales 
at retail some indication of such require-
ment could have been expressed in the stat-
ute. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
BLACKBIRD, C. J., and DAVISON, 
JOHNSON, and JACKSON, JJ.f concur. 
IRWIN and BERRY, JJ., concur in re-
sult 
WILLIAMS, J., dissents. 
386 P.2d—49 
Bern Ice L. AKIN, Petitioner, 
v. 
AKIN DISTRIBUTORS, INC., and 
Pacifie Employers Insurance 
Company, Respondents. 
No. 40211. 
Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 
tfov. 5, 1963. 
Original proceeding to review an or-
der of the State Industrial Court denying 
death benefits to mother of a deceased em-
ployee. The Supreme Court, Irwin, J., 
held that finding that claimant was not de-
pendent upon her deceased son within 
meaning of death benefit provisions of 
Compensation Act was reasonably support-
ed by the evidence. 
Affirmed. 
1. Workmen's Compensation €=>473 
That claimant, up to time of death of 
deceased son was able to take care of her-
self does not necessarily preclude her from 
being classed as dependent of deceased son 
for workmen's compensation purposes. 85 
O.S. 1961 § 1 et seq. 
2. Workmen's Compensation <£=4I6 
Reasonable expectation of continuing 
of future support and maintenance seems 
to be true criterion as to who are depend-
ents for workmen's compensation purposes. 
85 O.S.1961 § 1 et seq. 
3. Workmen's Compensation <S=>420 
Where claimant is able to provide 
himself with all necessities that are of 
pecuniary value, without aid of employee, 
fact that deceased employee may have 
made contributions to claimant during his 
lifetime and there was reasonable expecta-
tion of continuing contributions does not 
necessarily mean that claimant is eligible 
for death benefits under Workmen's Com-
pensation Act. 85 O.S.1961 § 1 et seq. 
4. Workmen's Compensation €=»I939 
Finding by State Industrial Court as 
to dependency under death benefit provi-
F - l 
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sions of Workmen's Compensation Act will 
not be disturbed on review where such find-
ing is reasonably supported by competent 
evidence. 85 O.S.1961 § 1 et seq. 
5. Workmen's Compensation <§= 1939 
On questions of fact Supreme Court 
cannot weigh evidence but is bound by or-
der of State Industrial Court, if it is rea-
sonably supported by the evidence. 
6. Workmen's Compensation €=>I480 
Finding of State Industrial Court that 
claimant was not dependent upon her de-
ceased son within meaning of death benefit 
provisions of Compensation Act was rea-
sonably supported by the evidence. 85 O.S. 
1961 § 1 et seq. 
Syllabus by the Court. 
A finding by the State Industrial Court 
as to dependency, under the death benefit 
provisions of the Workmen's Compensation 
Act, will not be disturbed on review where 
such finding is reasonably supported by 
competent evidence. 
Original proceeding to review an order 
of the State Industrial Court denying death 
benefits to mother of deceased employee. 
Order sustained. 
Farmer, Woolsey, Flippo & Bailey, by 
Lawrence Johnson, Tulsa, for petitioner. 
Donovan & Rogers, Gerard K. Donovan, 
Tulsa, for respondents. 
IRWIN, Justice. 
Bernice L. Akin filed a claim against 
Akin Distributors, Inc., and its insurance 
carrier, Pacific Employers Insurance Com-
pany, to recover death benefits under the 
Workmen's Compensation Act, for and on 
behalf of herself as the only dependent heir 
of Hugh Lewis Akin, Deceased. Bernice 
L. Akin is the mother of the decedent. 
The respondent insurance carrier chal-
lenged the claim and one of the grounds 
relied upon was that claimant was not de-
pendent upon the decedent for her liveli-
hood and support 
The trial judge denied recovery for the 
reason that claimant was not dependent 
upon decedent within the terms and mean-
ing of the Workmen's Compensation Act. 
The order of the trial judge denying re-
covery was sustained by the court en banc 
and claimant has petitioned for a review 
of the order denying recovery. 
FACTS 
Claimant's husband died in 1930 and she 
established a retail food store in Tulsa and 
later established a second store. Her two 
sons, Brown, then 15 years of age, and 
decedent, then 11 years old, continued their 
education and held part time jobs and as-
sisted their mother. They sold their home 
and purchased an acreage east of Tulsa 
with the title being in the three of them as 
joint tenants with right of survivorship. 
Akin Food Distributors, Inc., was later 
organized to handle and sell packaged and 
canned goods at wholesale and decedent 
was elected vice president of the corpora-
tion in charge of sales at a salary of 
$700.00 per month. Decedent owned no 
stock in the corporation. 
Claimant owned a house and lot in 
Tulsa; decedent had moved the house and 
sold it; he then supervised the construction 
of a business building or warehouse on 
the vacant lot which is leased for $15,600.00 
per year; it is mortgaged and the lease 
rentals are applied to the indebtedness. 
Claimant now owns an undivided one-
third interest in the lot and building. 
Claimant also owns an undivided one-
third interest in the warehouse occupied by 
Akin Distributors, Inc., which rents for 
$15,000.00 per year and the rentals are ap-
plied to the mortgage indebtedness. In 
addition to the real estate, claimant owns 
stock in Akin Distributors, Inc., which has 
an estimated value of $50,000.00 and is 
clear of liens; $2,000.00 invested in other 
stock; one Cadillac automobile and 8 riding 
horses. 
Claimant was receiving $200.00 per 
month from her retail stores and after she 
sold them for $21,000.00 and paying the iu-
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debtedness against them, she had $9,000.00 
remaining. The retail stores were sold aft-
er the death of decedent. Claimant had re-
ceived $400.00- per month salary from Akin 
Distributors, Inc., and at the time of trial 
her salary had been increased to $500.00 
per month; she also had a stock dividend 
of $450.00 and an annual bonus of $1186.00, 
which she has not withdrawn. 
Decedent had been married and had two 
sons. He and his wife were divorced but 
he had regularly paid money to his divorced 
wife for her support and the support of 
their minor children. Decedent's divorced 
wife and minor children died in the acci-
dent which caused decedent's death. 
Decedent had lived in the same home 
with claimant except for the short time he 
and his wife occupied an apartment. After 
the acreage was purchased, decedent had 
built a barn, tenant house, a car port, a 
concrete driveway and had repaired the 
place in general. He worked about the 
place in the mornings and evenings; he 
plowed, seeded, cut and baled hay and 
looked after the horses, cattle and hogs and 
tended to the sale of -he livestock and feed. 
While decedent was living with claimant 
he paid her $50.00 a month, and on two or 
three occasions, gave her more than 
$50.00, and he regularly purchased gro-
ceries. 
Under this set of facts, the trial judge 
found, and the same was approved by the 
Court en banc, that claimant was not a 
dependent heir of decedent within the 
terms and meaning of the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Claimant contends that the true criterion 
as to who are dependents is the reasonable 
expectation by a surviving heir of con-
tinuing future support and maintenance; 
that it matters not the petitioner up to the 
time of the death of decedent was able to 
take care of herself. In support of this 
contention, she cites and relies on Robber-
son Steel Company v. State Industrial 
Court, Okl., 354 P.2d 211; Sample v. State 
Industrial Commission, Okl., 262 P.2d 889; 
Oklahoma State Highway Department v. 
Nash, Okl., 297 P.2d 412; G. I. Construc-
tion Co. v. Osborn, 208 Okl. 554, 257 P.2d 
1056; Stubblefield v. Sebastian, Okl, 340 
P.2d 265; Dierks Forests, Inc. v. Parnell, 
Okl., 331 P.2d 392; and Oklahoma State 
Highway Department v. Peters, Okl., 291 
P.2d 825. 
We do not find the above cases neces-
sarily controlling in the case at bar. In 
each of the cases the question of depend-
ency was firmly established by competent 
evidence showing claimant had received 
benefits from the decedent workman which 
constituted substantial services or contribu-
tions which were relied upon for partial 
support and maintenance and there was 
reason to expect they would have continued 
in the future except for the intervention 
of death. Also, an examination oi all the 
above described cases show that we sus-
tained the order appealed from. 
[1,2] We agree with the rule of law 
that the fact that claimant up to the time 
of the death of decedent was able to take 
care of herself does not necessarily pre-
clude her from being classified as a depend-
ent of her deceased son. We are also 
mindful that the purpose of the Workmen's 
Compensation Act is to provide the Work-
men's dependents in the future with some-
thing in substitution for what has been 
lost by the workman's death, and, conse-
quently, to establish dependency, the appli-
cant for compensation must show that he 
or she had reasonable grounds to anticipate 
future support from the decedent. This 
reasonable expectation of continuing of 
future support and maintenance seems to 
be the true criterion as to who are depend-
ents. See Oklahoma State Highway De-
partment v. Peters, Okl., 291 P2d 825. 
[3] However, we are also mindful that 
where a claimant is wholly able to provide 
herself or himself with all the necessities 
that are of pecuniary value, without the 
aid of the employee, the fact that deceased 
employee may have made contributions to 
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the claimant during his lifetime and there 
is reasonable expectations of continuing 
contributions, does not necessarily mean 
that claimant is eligible for death benefits 
under the Workmen's Compensation Act. 
See Fox-Vliet Wholesale Drug Co. v. 
Chase, Okl., 288 P2d 391, which considers 
similar principles of law which are con-
trolling under the facts in the case at bar. 
In that case we said: 
"Without doubt the legislative expres-
sion that death benefits are payable 'to 
the dependents of the deceased employ-
ee as defined herein* refers to persons 
who presently or in reasonable future 
expectancy were in some degree actual-
ly relying on the said employee for 
necessary support and maintenance and 
persons not wholly able to exist or sus-
tain themselves at a station in life com-
parable to that of the employee without 
the financial aid of the said employee, 
and who are heirs at law of the deceas-
ed as defined by the Descent and Dis-
tribution statutes. 
"In other words, under language of the 
statute of clear and unmistakable 
meaning, an adult heir of a deceased 
employee, which heir is not a legal de-
pendent, and was and is wholly self-
suppoHing, or who was and is wholly 
able to provide himself with all the 
necessaries that are of pecuniary value, 
without the aid of the said employee, 
is not eligible for death benefits as pro-
vided for in the Workmen's Compen-
sation Act." 
In Sammons • . Faye Construction Co., 
Okl., 367 P2d 1021, we said: 
" • * • Occasional benefits or spo-
radic gifts and donations from an adult 
decedent workman will not, standing 
alone, establish partial dependence up-
on such workman unless the evidence, 
viewed as a whole, also shows that 
these benefits, instead of being a mere 
casual gratuity, constituted substantial 
services or contributions which were 
relied upon for necessities of life and 
there was reason to expect that they 
would have continued in the future ex-
cept for the intervention of death." 
[4-6] This Court has repeatedly held 
that a finding by the State Industrial Court 
as to dependency, under the death benefit 
provision of the Workmen's Compensation 
Act, will not be disturbed on review where 
such finding is reasonably supported by 
competent evidence. See Sammons v. Faye 
Construction Company, supra; Fox-Vlict 
Wholesale Drug Co. v. Chase, supra; and 
In re Updike's Heirs, Okl., 282 P.2d 230. 
We are bound by the rule that on questions 
of fact, we cannot weigh the evidence but 
are bound by the order of the State In-
dustrial Court when it is reasonably sup-
ported by competent evidence. There is 
competent evidence reasonably supporting 
the order of the commission. 
Having determined that the order of the 
Industrial Court must be sustained, we find 
it unnecessary to determine the specifica-
tions of error urged by the Respondent. 
Also, the question of revivor heretofore 
presented by the parties is moot and need 
not be considered. 
Order sustained. 
O I tlT «ll'Wt*t STSTtH, 
Roy F. SPEED, Plaintiff In Error, 
v. 
George E. WHALIN, Defendant in Error. 
No. 40194. 
Supreme Court of Oklahoma. 
Nov. 5, 1963. 
Action by employee against employer 
for injuries sustained when employee fell 
off roof of house. The District Court, 
Oklahoma County, Boston W. Smith, J., 
sustained a demurrer to the evidence, and 
the employee appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Halley, V. C. J., held that evidence 
was insufficient to establish that there was 
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sequence, none that Stringham could not 
have averted the collision by exercising 
due care, none that there was no adequate 
warning because of an unlighted truck, 
none except one isolated accident sometime 
before, none that indicated any kind of 
hazard save the misguided diesel, none that 
the Commission should have put up signs, 
reduced the speed limit, or that it unrea-
sonably exercised its authorized statutory 
discretion under the facts of this case. 
Contrariwise, unless we indulge speculation 
or emotion based on unwarranted assump-
tion of undemonstrated pertinent facts, we 
or the jury could arrive at no other conclu-
sion than that indulged by the trial court. 
On the other hand, it would strain reason 
to conclude, under the facts of this case, 
that there was anything but one negli-
gence,—that of Trone—or that of String-
ham,—or a concurrence of both, which was 
the concurring or sole proximate cause of 
the incident here,—wholly divorced from 
State involvement. Those issues persist, 
perhaps, for a trial on the merits among 
the remaining litigants, since this appeal 
has to do only with liability as to the de-
fendant Road Commission. 
ELLETT, TUCKETT, CROCKETT 
and MAUGHAN, JJ., concur. 
Lorln R. FARNSWORTH, father of Matt 
Robert Farnsworth, Deceased, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
rhi INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of Utah 
et a!., Defendants. 
No. 13910. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 24, 1975. 
Father of deceased minor workman 
was denied benefits under Workmen's 
Compensation Act by the Industrial Com-
mission and he appealed. The Supreme 
534 P.2d—57 
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Court, Maughan, J., held that deceased 
workman's father, who was legally blind, 
who had relied upon workman to transport 
him to veterans hospital and doctor's of-
fice, and to perform yard work at his home 
and his father's home, and whose wife had 
been employed for 12 years and who re-
ceived veteran's disability benefit of $548 
per month and civil service annuity of $220 
per month was not entitled to benefits as 
a dependent. 
Decision of the Industrial Commission 
sustained. 
1. Workmen's Compensation <§=>4I2 
"Dependency" within statute permit-
ting award of workmen's compensation ben-
efits to persons who were dependent on 
deceased worker does not mean absolute 
dependency for the necessities of life, but 
rather that the applicant looked to and re-
lied on the contributions of the workman, 
in whole or in part, as a means of support-
ing and maintaining himself in accordance 
with his social position and accustomed 
mode of life. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-68(3), 35-
1-71. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
2. Workmen's Compensation $=»476 
Deceased minor workman's father, who 
was legally blind, who relied on the work-
man for transportation to veterans hospital 
and doctor's office, who relied on workman 
to perform yard work around the home 
and to aid him in taking care of his par-
ents' home, and who received veteran's 
disability benefits of $548 per month and 
civil service annuity of $220 per month 
and whose wife worked did not have the 
type of "dependency" relationship with the 
deceased workman necessary to permit him 
to recover under the Workmen's Compen-
sation Act. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-68(3), 35-
1-71. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
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J. Anthony Eyre, Kipp & Christian, Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiff. 
Vernon B. Romney, Atty. Gen., Frank V. 
Nelson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, 
for defendants. 
MAUGHAN, Justice: 
Matt Robert Farnsworth, a 19-year-old, 
sustained fatal injuries in the course of 
his employment, when the truck he was 
operating overturned. The claimant, Lorin 
R. Farnsworth, is the father of decedent, 
and he filed a claim before the Industrial 
Commission, asserting that he was par-
tially dependent on his son and thus was 
entitled to the benefits provided by Section 
35-1-68(3), U.C.A.1953. Upon hearing 
before a trial examiner, the claim of the 
applicant was denied. Upon review before 
the Industrial Commission the determina-
tion of the trial examiner was affirmed on 
the ground that although the applicant may 
have been dependent upon deceased for 
certain activities, the dependency, as ex-
pressed by the evidence, was not the type 
contemplated and intended within the 
meaning of the Workmen's Compensation 
Act. 
Applicant is classified as legally band 
and has been unemployed for the past eight-
een years. At the time of his son's death, 
applicant was receiving a veteran's dis-
ability benefit of $548 per month and a civil 
service annuity of $220 per month. Ap-
plicant's wife has been gainfully employed 
for twelve years. Decedent was regularly 
employed since his graduation from high 
school in June, 1973. He died January 
17, 1974. Claimant has one other minor 
son, Mark, residing with him. Mark grad-
uated from high school in June, 1974, and 
had previously been employed during the 
summer of 1973, although at the time of 
the hearing he was not employed, while 
convalescing from surgery. 
Applicant's claim of partial dependency 
is predicated upon the services his son per-
formed and not upon direct financial as-
sistance. The decedent had read his fa-
ther's mail and other documents, transport-
ed him to the Veterans Hospital and doc-
tor's office for medical treatments, and 
performed chores such as yard work about 
his father's house. The decedent trans-
ported his father about the town to pay 
utility bills and other obligations, although 
claimant admitted the primary purpose of 
this service was to get him out of the house. 
The applicant further undertook the re-
sponsibility for caring for his parents' 
home and decedent had performed many of 
these tasks, such as filling the coal stoker, 
doing yard work, and snow removal. The 
applicant sometimes reimbursed his son 
for the gasoline expense incurred in per-
forming these services. Since Matt's death, 
his brother, Mark, has performed the serv-
ices previously rendered by decedent for 
their father. 
In this review plaintiff contends that he 
was partially dependent upon his son with-
in the meaning of the Workmen's Compen-
sation Act. 
Section 35-1-71, U.C.A.1953, specifies 
two classes, who are legislatively presumed 
to be wholly dependent for support upon 
a deceased employee. The statute further 
provides: 
In all other cases, the question of de-
pendency, in whole or in part, shall be de-
termined in accordance with the facts in 
each particular case existing at the 
time of the injury resulting in the death 
of such employee, but no person shall be 
considered as a dependent unless he is a 
member of the family of the deceased 
employee, or bears to him the relation 
of husband or wife, lineal descendant, 
ancestor, or brother or sister. . . . 
By the express terms of Section 35-1-
71, U.C.A.1953, the subject matter of the 
statute concerns those persons who are 
"dependent for support upon a deceased 
employee." The case law of this state has 
consistently limited dependency to those 
fact situations wherein the deceased had 
contributed financial assistance or com-
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parable assistance such as growing food, 
which was used in supporting the depend-
ent.1 
In Rigby v. Industrial Commission,' this 
court stated: 
Whether one person is dependent upon 
another within the meaning of the Work-
men's Compensation Act is primarily a 
question of fact. It is the exclusive 
province of the Industrial Commission to 
determine the facts and to draw legiti-
mate inferences therefrom. It is also, 
in the first instance, the province of the 
Commission to determine from such facts 
and inferences whether dependency does 
or does not exist. When, however, the 
established facts and inferences reason-
ably deductible therefrom can lead to 
but one conclusion, a question of law is 
presented which this court, upon proper 
application, must review. 
This court explained:3 
In this case the burden was on plaintiff 
to establish dependency. The Workmen's 
Compensation Act creates no presump-
tion that a father is dependent upon his 
son for support and maintenance* To en-
title plaintiff to compensation in this 
case, it must affirmatively be made to 
appear that at the time of the injury 
(1) plaintiff 'relied upon his son, in 
whole or in part, for his support and 
maintenance; (2) that had the son not 
been killed plaintiff would in all prob-
ability have received some assistance 
from his son; (3) that it was reason-
ably necessary for the son to render his 
father some financial aid in order that 
the father might continue to live in a 
condition suitable and becoming to his 
station in life. 
I. Daly Mining Co. v. Industrial Comm., 67 
Utah 483, 248 P. 125 (1926). 
? 75 Utah 454, 458, 286 P. 628 (1930). 
1 At |» 459 of 75 Utfth, at p 630 of 286 P 
«. 78 Utah 495, 501, 5 P.2d 242 (1931). 
5 84 Utah 481, 488, 36 P^d 979 (1934). 
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In the Rigby case this court observed 
the upon the record it appeared that the 
father had relied upon his son for financial 
aid and that if the son had lived, he 
would have, in all probability, continued to 
render financial assistance. This court 
characterized the serious issue to be wheth-
er it could be determined as a matter of 
law that the father could not have con-
tinued to live in a condition suitable and 
becoming to his station in life without any 
assistance from his son. After reviewing 
the facts, this court concluded that the 
Commission could reasonably infer the fa-
ther had sufficient funds for his support 
and maintenance according to his station 
in life; and therefore, it could not be held 
as a matter of law that the father was de-
pendent upon his son for support and 
maintenance. 
[I] In Utah Galena Corp. v. Industrial 
Commission 4 this court cited with approval 
authority which expressed the view that 
dependency within the terms of the statute 
does not mean absolute dependency for 
the necessities of life, but rather that the 
applicant looked to and relied on the con-
tributions of the workman, in whole or in 
part, as a means of supporting and main-
taining himself in accordance with his 
social position and accustomed mode of 
life. This concept was reiterated in Park 
Utah Consolidated Mines Co. v. Industrial 
Commission:5 
A dependent is one who looks to 
another for support, and the true criter-
ion is whether one has a reasonable ex-
pectation of continuing or future support 
—to receive such contributions as are 
necessary and needed to maintain him in 
his accustomed station in life.* 
6. Also see Bradshaw v. Ind. Comm., 103 
Utah 405, 135 P.2d 530 (1943), wherein 
dependency was determined in terms of finan-
cial support, and Roller Coaster Co. v. Ind. 
Comm., 112 Utah 532, 189 P.2d 709 (1948), 
where the finding of partial dependency was 
predicated on the son's contributions of cash, 
groceries, and care of a garden which fur-
nished vegetables and other produce for the 
family. 
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[2] In the instant action, the assistance 
rendered by decedent to his father was not 
comparable to financial assistance to main-
tain him in his accustomed station in life. 
It was greater, it was the love, affection, 
and companionship of a dutiful child; and 
deserving of the highest commendation. 
Such assistance, as is here shown, com-
mendable as it is, does not establish de-
pendency within the Workmen's Compen-
sation Act, the purpose of which is to 
provide compensation for the probable 
financial loss suffered by dependents on 
account of the death of the decedent. 
The decision of the Industrial Commis-
sion is sustained. 
HENRIOD, C J., and ELLETT, 
CROCKETT and TUCKETT, JJ., concur. 
° *
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 STSHH, 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, a corpo-
ration, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
F IRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, N.A., 
a corporation, Defendant and Appellant, 
v. 
Don ALLEN, dba Mount Nebo Cattle Com-
pany, Intervenor, Respondent and 
Cross-Appellant, 
v. 
J. B. J. FEED YARDS, INC., a corporation, 
et a!., Involuntary Defendants. 
No. 13725. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 15, 1975. 
Bank, which had security interest in 
cattle owned by shipper, brought conver-
sion action against defendant bank, which 
had security interest in cattle of corpora-
tion which was in business of buying and 
selling cattle. The shipper intervened. 
The Fourth District Court, Utah County, 
George E. Ballif, J., entered judgment 
against defendant, and defendant appealed 
and intervenor cross-appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Tuckett, J., held that evi-
dence that, inter alia, corporation received 
cattle under agreement with shipper that 
title would pass upon payment but that 
payment was not made, was sufficient to 
sustain finding that ownership of cattle in 
question did not pass to corporation but re-
mained in shipper; but that defendant 
bank was entitled to offset for cost of 
feeding cattle which had been attached by 
defendant. 
Judgment affirmed. 
1. Secured Transactions €=»t 16 
Bank, which had security interest in 
cattle of corporation which was in business 
of buying and selling cattle, could claim no 
security interest in cattle which remained 
in ownership of shipper, who had agreed 
to sell cattle to corporation, with title to 
pass upon payment, but who had not been 
paid. 
2. Appeal and Error €=1010.1(6) 
Supreme Court's review in cases rais-
ing questions of fact rather than issues of 
law goes only to problem of whether find-
ings of trial court are supported by sub-
stantial evidence. 
3. Appeal and Error <§=>I0I2.I(3) 
Supreme Court will not upset findings 
of trial court unless evidence clearly pre-
ponderates to the contrary. 
4. Secured Transactions <£=>! 16 
In conversion action by plaintiff bank, 
which had security interest in cattle owned 
by shipper, against defendant bank, which 
had security interest in cattle of corpora-
tion which was in business of buying and 
selling cattle, evidence that, inter alia, cor-
poration received cattle under agreement 
with shipper that title would pass only 
upon payment, which payment was not 
made, was sufficient to sustain findings 
that ownership of cattle in question did not 
pass to corporation but remained in shipper 
and did not become subject to financing 
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since the support poles for the signs were 
set in concrete prior to 8 December 1971, 
the signs were lawfully in existence on that 
date, thus compensation is due. We agree 
that DOT had the burden of proving a 
violation of Section 479.11(1), disagree with 
the other contentions, and affirm. 
National Advertising, the owner of two 
outdoor signs located in Duval County, was 
cited by DOT for violation of Section 479.-
11(1). The parties stipulated that both 
signs were within 660 feet of the right-of-
way of 1-95. However, National Advertis-
ing contends that these signs fell within the 
statutory exception of Section 479.111(2). 
The parties further stipulated that at 
least the poles for the two structures were 
erected prior to 8 December 1971. There 
was uncontradicted testimony that there 
were no advertising faces on the poles until 
on or about 26 April 1972. 
On 6 November 1981, DOT entered its 
final order directing that the signs be re-
moved without compensation. 
[1] This court held in Henderson Sign 
Service v. DOT, 390 So.2d 159 (Fla. 1st DCA 
1980), that the burden of proving entitle-
ment to any of the exceptions of Chapter 
479 is upon the one claiming the exception. 
Therefore, National Advertising had the 
burden of proving it fell within the excep-
tion of Section 479.111(2). This it failed to 
do. 
Fla H43 
THOMPSON, J, concurs. 
BOOTH, J., dissents with opinion. 
BOOTH, Judge, dissenting: 
I respectfully dissent and would reinstate 
the recommended order of the hearing offi-
cer requiring that compensation be paid for 
the taking of private property in this case. 
Florida Statutes, Section 479.24, is suscepti-
ble of a construction that compensation be 
paid for signs begun prior to, but not com-
pleted until after, December 8, 1971. That 
construction should prevail in accordance 
with the basic principle of statutory con-
struction that, where more than one inter-
pretation of a statutory enactment is possi-
ble, the court avoid the interpretation 
which may render the enactment unconsti-
tutional. 
O I KEYNUMBERSYSTEIO 
Alfred TERRINONI (deceased) by Ann 
Terrinoni, Appellants, 
v. 
[2] In LaPointe Outdoor Advertising v. 
Florida DOT, 398 So.2d 1370 (Fla.1981), the 
Florida Supreme Court ruled that no com-
pensation need be made for removal of 
signs that were not lawfully in existence on 
8 December 1971. In view of the definition 
in Section 479.01(1), bare poles do not con-
stitute a "sign" within the meaning of Sec-
tion 479.24(1). National Advertising's em-
phasis on the word "intended*' in Section 
479.01(1) is misplaced. This word clearly 
refers to a present intent to advertise or to 
inform the public, not to an intent to build 
a sign sometime in the future. Therefore, 
since National Advertising's signs were not 
lawfully in existence on 8 December 1971, 
no compensation is due. 
AFFIRMED. 
WESTWARD HO! and Kent Insurance 
Company, Appellees. 
No. AG-228. 
District Court of Appeal of Florida, 
First District. 
Aug. 23, 1982. 
Rehearing Denied Sept. 20, 1982. 
Mother of deceased employee appealed 
from order of deputy commissioner finding 
that her dependency under the Workers' 
Compensation Act had ended. The District 
Court of Appeal, Ervin, J., held that: (1) 
evidence demonstrated that mother had 
been dejindent u}x>n her son at the time of 
his death, bui (2) mother who was her son's 
H-l 
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sole beneficiary and heir and had received 
all the benefits to which she was entitled, 
some $155,000 from a combination of 
sources, was no longer a dependent. 
Affirmed. 
1. Workers* Compensation <s=>1481 
Evidence that decedent gave his moth-
er $125 each month, that he helped pay off 
the mortgage on her house, that he helped 
her writh the household purchases and ex-
penses, and that she was not receiving 
court-ordered alimony from her former hus-
band, although she was receiving social se-
curity benefits, sustained finding that dece-
dent's mother was dependent upon the de-
cedent at the time of his death. West's 
F.S.A. § 440.16. 
2. Statutes o=>223.2(34) 
Provisions of statute setting forth com-
pensation to be paid for death of worker 
should be read in pari materia to achieve 
the statutory purpose of protecting
 m the 
workers' dependents against hardships that 
arise from the workers' death arising out of 
employment and occurring during employ-
ment and of preventing those who depend 
on workers' wages from becoming charges 
on the community. West's F.S.A. § 440.16. 
3. Statutes c=*202, 206 
Statutory language is not to be as-
sumed to be superfluous; statute must be 
construed so as to give meaning to all words 
and phrases contained within that statute. 
4. Workers' Compensation <e=>419, 1715 
Dependency for purposes of workers' 
compensation is a question of fact to be 
determined by the circumstances of the 
case; it must be shown that the claimant, 
because of physical or mental incapacity, or 
lack of means, is dependent upon the de-
ceased for support; actual and substantial 
support must have been received by the 
claimant from the decedent and the support 
must be shown to have been made regularly 
with reasonable expectation to be made in 
1. The deput\ found that decedent's death did 
not arise out of and in the course of his emplov 
ment with the City of Cora! Gables This find-
the future; casual gifts at irregular inter-
vals will not support a claim based on de-
pendency; test is whether the claimant re-
lies on the contributions to maintain his or 
her customary standard of living and 
whether, in the absence of continuance of 
support, lifestyle of the claimant would be 
materially altered. West's F.S.A. § 440.16. 
5. Workers' Compensation <s=»476 
Decedent's mother who, following his 
death, received approximately $155,000 
from a combination of sources due to being 
her son's sole heir and beneficiary was no 
longer a dependent and workers' compensa-
tion could be terminated. West's F.S.A. 
§ 440.16. 
Stephen Marc Slepin of Slepin, Slepin, 
Lambert & Waas, Tallahassee, for appel-
lants. 
Kathleen V. McCarthy, Hialeah, for ap-
pellees. 
ERVIN, Judge. 
In this .workers' compensation case, the 
mother of a deceased employee appeals the 
order of the deputy commissioner finding 
that her dependency under the Workers' 
Compensation Act has ended, and that, as a 
matter of law, she was not entitled to de-
pendency benefits under Section 440.-
16(l)(b)4, Florida Statutes (1979). We af-
firm. 
In its cross-appeal, the employer, West-
ward Ho!, and its carrier appeal the depu-
ty's finding that at the time of decedent's 
death he was an employee of Westward Ho! 
The employer/carrier argues that decedent 
was an independent contractor not covered 
by the Act. We affirm the deputy's order 
as to decedent's employee status without 
opinion.1 
[1] The deceased was a police sergeant 
for the City of Coral Gabies He was killed 
on October 11, 1980, in an armed robbery 
while picking up the receipts in his off-duty 
ing was not appealed and the city's motion to 
be dismissed as a part\ has been granted b\ 
unpublished order of this court 
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job with Westward Ho! restaurant. Appel-
lant is the 63-year-old divorced mother of 
decedent. The deputy found that appellant 
was dependent on the deceased at the time 
of his death, and appellees do not argue 
otherwise. Such finding is supported by 
competent, substantial evidence. The rec-
ord shows the decedent gave his mother 
$125 in cash each month, helped pay off the 
mortgage on her house, and helped with her 
household purchases and expenses. Appel-
lant's former husband is under court order 
to pay alimony, but she does not receive 
payments. Although appellant worked at a 
clothing store and began receiving Social 
Security benefits in April, 1980, the deputy 
found that she wTas unable to support her-
self. 
The deputy's finding that appellant's de-
pendency ended is based on the fact that by 
December 31, 1980, she had received all 
benefits due her as her son's sole heir and 
beneficiary. She received a total of ap-
proximately $155,000 from a combination of 
sources. As to that issue, the deputy con-
cluded: "In order to give any meaning to 
§ 440.16(2Xd), Florida Statutes [The statute 
is in fact Section 440.16(l)(b)4, Florida Stat-
utes (1979).] . . ., it is clear that it is con-
templated that the dependency of a parent 
under the Workers' Compensation Act can 
end." Section 440.16(l)(b)4 states: 
440.16 Condensation for death.— 
(1) If death results from the accident 
within 1 year thereafter . . ., the employ-
er shall pay: 
(b) Compensation . . . in the following 
percentages of the average weekly wages 
to the following persons entitled thereto 
on account of dependency upon the de-
ceased, . . .: 
4. To the parents, 25 percent to each, 
such compensation to be paid during the 
continuance of dependency. 
The deputy ordered the e/c to pay death 
benefits from the date of accident through 
December 31, 1980. 
Appellant argues that dependency status 
is fixed on the date of the employee's 
death; that she qualified for benefits by 
virtue of her dependency on the employee 
and his compensable death, and that the 
policy of workers' compensation is to pre-
clude continuous litigation. Thus, she con-
tinues, benefits cannot be terminated, for if 
a post-mortem event can terminate depend-
ency and one's workers' compensation 
rights, then another event can reinstate de-
pendency, consequently she concludes that 
the legislature did not intend to allow this 
open-ended condition leading to perpetual 
litigation and unmanageable administra-
tion. 
Appellant supports this argument with a 
passage from Professor Larson: 
Once rights as a dependent under an 
award have been acquired, the majority— 
but by no means unanimous—view is that 
they are not lost by a subsequent change 
in the dependent's financial position, nor 
by any change short of the events, such 
as remarriage or attainment of a speci-
fied age, expressly terminating compen-
sation by statute. Getting a self-support-
ing job, for example, or an inheritance 
from the deceased or others, or being 
adopted, or contracting a marriage later 
annulled, or living with and being sup-
ported by a man without benefit of mar-
riage, will not interrupt the right to bene-
fits as a dependent. While this may pro-
duce occasional results inconsistent with 
the spirit and purpose of compensation 
protection, the administrative conve-
nience of crystallizing of rights as of 
some definite date once and for all proba-
bly counterbalances this objection. 
2 Larson, The Law of Workmen's Com}>en-
sation § 64.43 at 11-209 (1981). 
However, this section is susceptible to 
another interpretation, especially when bol-
stered by the plain meaning of the statute. 
According to Larson, rights as a dependent 
can be lost by an event expressly terminat-
ing compensation by statute. Section 440.-
16(2) expressly states that the dependence 
of a spouse of a deceased employee shall 
terminate with remarriage; the dependence 
1146 Fla. 418 SOUTHERN REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
of a child shall terminate with the attain-
ment of eighteen years of age, twenty-two 
years of age if a full-time student, or upon 
marriage. Dependency is deemed not to 
continue past these events. The legislative 
intent is clearly to allow for termination of 
dependency. 
There is no statutory language limiting 
termination of a parent's dependency to the 
happening of a specific event. Perhaps the 
legislative intent was to allow for flexibility 
in the individual situations concerning par-
ents. 
[2] We consider that the provisions of 
Section 440.16 should be read in pari mate-
ria to achieve the statutory purpose to pro-
tect workers' dependents against hardships 
that arise from workers' deaths arising out 
of employment and occurring during em-
ployment, and to prevent those who depend 
on workers' wages from becoming charges 
on the community. See, McCoy v. F.P. & 
L., 87 So.2d 809 (Fla. 1956). Here, a termi-
nation of benefits would not thwart such 
purpose. 
[3,4] Statutory language is not to be 
assumed superfluous; a statute must be 
construed so as to give meaning to all words 
and phrases contained within that statute. 
Vocolle v. Knight Brothers Paper Co., 118 
So.2d 664 (Fla. 1st DCA 1960). Meaning 
must be given to the legislature's clear 
and unambiguous words "[S]uch compensa-
tion to be paid during the continuance of 
dependency." "Continuance" is the time 
during which something exists or lasts; du-
ration. The American Heritage Dictionary 
288 (1979). "Dependency," for purposes of 
workers' compensation, is a question of fact 
to be determined by the circumstances of 
the case. Thus, it must be shown that the 
claimant, because of physical or mental in-
capacity, or lack of means, is dependent on 
the deceased for support; that actual and 
substantial support must have been re-
ceived by claimant from deceased, and that 
such support must be shown to have been 
2. When this section appeared in Florida's first 
Workmen's Compensation Act, it read as fol-
lows 
made regularly with reasonable expectation 
to be made in the future, and that casual 
gifts at irregular intervals will not support 
a claim based on dependency. Panama City 
Stevedoring Co. v. Padgett, 149 Fla. 687, 6 
So.2d 822, 823 (1942). The test is whether 
the claimant relies on the contributions to 
maintain his or her customary standard of 
living and, whether in the absence of con-
tinuance of support, the lifestyle of the 
claimant would be materially altered. See, 
Paul Spellman, Inc. v. Spellman, 103 So.2d 
661, 664 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1958); Larson & 
Sons Developing, Inc. v. Ashley, IRC Order 
2-3051 (1976). 
[5] Claimant is not dependent upon the 
workers' compensation death benefits to 
maintain her customary standard of living. 
The evidence, including claimant's testimo-
ny, shows that her standard of living is no 
less than it was while her son was alive. 
The plain meaning of the language and 
the facts frustrate claimant's contention 
that "there is no warrant in law" for hold-
ing that dependency at death does not fix 
entitlement to benefits where the depend-
ent receives an inheritance as a result of 
the death, as well her argument that once a 
parent's dependency is established at any 
point in time, it continues regardless of 
changed circumstances. 
The section in the Act concerning the 
dependency of parents has remained essen-
tially unchanged since 1935.2 The phrase at 
issue appears to have been interpreted only 
once in Palm Beach Dairy Co. v. Ryan, 154 
Fla. 648, 18 So.2d 537 (1944). There the 
deceased employee had lived with his moth-
er who was dependent on him for support. 
The employee had been earning $17.50 per 
week at the time of his death. The insur-
ance carrier had paid compensation to the 
deceased's mother for 47 weeks at the rate 
of $6.25 per week. The carrier stopped 
payment because some half-brothers had 
entered into a contract to pay the mother 
To the parents. 25 per centum to each Such 
compensation shall be paid during the contin-
uance of dependency. S. 16(c)(5) Ch. 17481, 
Laws of Fla. (1935). 
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$15.00 per week for a limited period. The 
court stated: 
The question presented is whether such 
payments had the effect of relieving the 
mother of dependency as contemplated 
by Section 440.16, . . . and thereby de-
stroy her claim for compensation. 
We think this question requires a nega-
tive answer. Who are dependents under 
the Workmen's Compensation Act is rela-
tive and may be influenced by many fac-
tors, but it is not limited to such as have 
a bare subsistence living or purchance a 
limited income from other sources. 
Somewhere along the road from rags to 
affluence, the right to workman's com-
pensation would no doubt be surrendered 
but we hold this point to be above the 
bare subsistence level. 
Id., 18 So.2d at 537. (emphasis supplied) 
In Ryan, benefits were paid to maintain the 
mother's customary - standard of living. 
Here, unlike Ryan, the parent, after receiv-
ing approximately $155,000.00, if not afflu-
ent, could hardly be considered at^the bare 
subsistence level." We believe that Ryan 
implies that there can be a dependency cut-
off point. 
Further support for our position is found 
in Edelblut, Inc. v. Ford, IRC Order 2-2489 
(1974), in which a finding of dependency of 
the deceased employee's mother and minor 
siblings was affirmed, but which held also 
that once the mother secured employment, 
dependency terminated and payments 
should have been halted. Although the 
mother secured employment more than a 
year before the judge's order was entered, 
the judge found the dependency to be con-
tinuing and ordered the e/c to pay compen-
sation. On appeal the Commission stated 
that the act "provides for death benefits to 
be paid to the parents of a deceased em-
ployee from the date of death to such time 
as dependency has terminated." With the 
advent of the deceased employee's mother 
securing employment, her status as a de-
pendent terminated, and payments should 
have also terminated. The Commission re-
versed the judge's order with instructions 
to award death benefits only from the date 
of death to the date of employment. 
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We believe the above considerations out-
weigh any need for administrative conve-
nience requiring crystallizing claims as of a 
definite date. At this point we need only 
observe that the Act, by its nature, allows 
for modification of orders in other situa-
tions. 
Accordingly, the order of the deputy is 
AFFIRMED.* 
ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., C.J., and 
SHAWr, J., concur. 
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PER CURIAM. 
The judgment below is affirmed. Knight 
v. State, 394 So.2d 997 (Fla. 1981) 
BOOTH and SHIVERS, JJ.f concur. 
JOANOS, J., dissents with written opin-
ion. 
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